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The aim of study is to examine whether ASEAN banks actively manage their liquidity or 
not and how effective the liquidity risk has been managed. Two liquidity measurements 
have been used, the first one is net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which indicates banks’ 
long-term liquidity buffer and the second one is the short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT). 
The study used annual data of 87 banks that operate in 6-ASEAN countries over 20-year 
period (1996-2015). Firstly, partial adjustment model is employed to examine whether 
ASEAN banks do have liquidity target ratios. The findings showed thatthe average 
estimated liquidity target for NSFR is 1.4936, and 0.6417 for SHORT. These findings 
confirm that ASEAN banks do have liquidity targets. Secondly, generalized method of 
moments (GMM) is employed to estimate the speed of adjustment of ASEAN banks 
towards their liquidity target ratios. The findings revealed that the adjustment speed for 
NSFR is 0.406 and 0.366 for SHORT, this implied that ASEAN banks adjust their NSFR 
quicker than their SHORT. Thirdly, GMM estimation method is used to examine the 
determinants of banks’ liquidity target ratios. The results showed that bank size was found 
positively related with NSFR and negatively with SHORT. Furthermore, equity ratio and 
asset quality negatively affected both NSFR and SHORT, while bank growth plan, funding 
cost and interest rate spread were positively influencing the liquidity targets for both NSFR 
and SHORT. In addition, GDP was found insignificant for both NSFR and SHORT. 
Fourthly, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimation technique is used to examine 
the determinants of ASEAN banks’ speed of adjustment toward liquidity. The results 
showed that the liquidity distance from target level (GAP) was positively related with the 
adjustment speed whereasbank size, GDP growth, and financial crises had negative impacts 
on the banks’ speed of adjustment. Lastly, OLS regression is used to examine the impact 
of speed of adjustment toward liquidity on banks’ profitability. The results showed that the 
liquidity’s speed of adjustment affected banks’ profitability negatively.  
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Kajian ini bermatlamat untuk menyelidik sama ada bank ASEAN mengurus elemen 
kecairan (liquidity) mereka secara aktif ataupun tidak dan cara bank tersebut menangani 
risiko kecairan dengan berkesan. Dua ukuran kecairan diupayakan dalam kajian ini. 
Ukuran yang pertama ialah nisbah dana stabil bersih (NSFR) yang memperlihatkan 
penimbal kecairan jangka panjang bank dan ukuran yang kedua ialah nisbah kecairan 
jangka pendek (SHORT). Kajian ini menggunakan data tahunan bagi tempoh dua puluh 
tahun (1996-2015) untuk sejumlah 87 bank yang beroperasi di enam negara ASEAN. 
Pertama sekali, model pelarasan separa diupayakan untuk menyelidik sama ada bank 
ASEAN mempunyai nisbah sasaran kecairan ataupun tidak. Dapatan menunjukkan bahawa 
sasaran kecairan yang dianggarkan secara purata untuk NSFR ialah 1.4936 dan 0.6417 
untuk SHORT.  Dapatan ini mengesahkan bahawa bank ASEAN mempunyai sasaran 
kecairan. Kajian kemudiannya menggunakan kaedah momen teritlak (GMM) untuk 
menganggarkan kelajuan pelarasan bank ASEAN bagi nisbah sasaran kecairan mereka. 
Dapatan memaparkan bahawa kelajuan pelarasan NSFR ialah 0.406 dan kelajuan pelarasan 
SHORT pula ialah 0.366. Hal ini menunjukkan bahawa bank ASEAN menyelaraskan 
NSFR mereka lebih cepat berbanding SHORT. Seterusnya, kaedah anggaran GMM 
digunakan untuk meneliti penentuan nisbab sasaran kecairan bank. Dapatan 
memperlihatkan bahawa saiz bank didapati berkait secara positif dengan NSFR dan berkait 
secara negatif dengan SHORT. Selain itu, nisbah ekuiti dan kualiti asest mempengaruhi 
secara negatif kedua-dua NSFR dan SHORT, manakala rancangan pembangunan bank, kos 
dana, dan rebakan kadar faedah mempengaruhi secara positif sasaran kecairan untuk NSFR 
dan SHORT. GDP juga didapati tidak signifikan untuk kedua-dua NSFR dan SHORT. 
Teknik anggaran regresi kuasa dua terkecil biasa (OLS) pula digunakan untuk mengkaji 
penentu kelajuan pelarasan kecairan bagi bank ASEAN. Dapatan menunjukkan bahawa 
jarak kecairan daripada tahap sasaran (GAP) berkait secara positif dengan kelajuan 
pelarasan manakala saiz bank, pertumbuhan GDP, dan krisis kewangan memberikan impak 
yang negatif terhadap kelajuan pelarasan bank. Akhir sekali, regresi OLS digunakan untuk 
meneliti impak kelajuan pelarasan kecairan terhadap keuntungan bank. Dapatan 
memaparkan bahawa kelajuan pelarasan kecairan mempengaruhi keuntungan bank secara 
negatif. 
Kata kunci: Negara ASEAN; bank perdagangan; NSFR; nisbah kecairan jangka pendek; 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
The recent line of banking theoretical literature emphasizes the role of banks in creating 
liquidity on the base of financing long-term assets with short-term liabilities. However, the 
heavy reliance on short-term sources of funds has exposed banks to liquidity risk that was 
very clear over the global financial crisis 2007-2008. Banks in many countries experienced 
liquidity shortages because of the turmoil of wholesale bank funding markets. The most 
vulnerable banks in US banking system were heavily affected to the extent that these banks 
found themselves unable to renew their borrowing. This segment of banks and other 
financial institutions have suffered big losses on their investments in the subprime market 
that leads to illiquidity and which necessitated government support (Acharya & Merrouche, 
2013; Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011; 
Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; King, 2013) 
 
In response to that crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has 
developed the third record "Basel III" to strengthen the existing capital requirements and 
to cope with the illiquidity issues and funding unrests arose during the crisis. By 
introducing the new record, BCBS aimed to address deficiencies of Basel II that was 
adopted in 2004 which was structured around imposing capital requirements based on three 
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pillars: credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Basel III introduced a package of 
reforms in order to enhance the resilience of individual banks and the banking system as a 
whole, these reforms covered three main fields: promoting both the quality and quantity of 
banks' capital, imposing maximum level of leverage, and enhancing the soundness of bank 
liquidity management (Chan & Worth, 2011).  
 
The liquidity requirements that were introduced in December 2010, came into effect in 
2015 but will not be fully implemented before 2019, consist of two liquidity standards, the 
first addresses the short-term liquidity risk -over 30 days- and was named the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to deal with the issue of 
long-term liquidity risk (BCBS, 2010).  
 
Although, LCR is calculated by dividing “the bank’s high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) 
over the total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days”. It requires financial 
institutions to maintain enough liquid assets to pay a cash outflow of the coming 30 days 
in a stress scenario (BCBS, 2013). High-quality liquid assets (HQLA) consist of two assets 
groups; level 1 and level 2 assets. Level 1 revers to cash & equivalent item and other assets 
that could be easily liquidated in a stressed. Therefore, the entire market value of this 
category is added to HQLA. However, lower liquid assets are considered in the second 
category that consists of assets that are likely to be sold at nearly full value, only 85 percent 
of this category is added to the HQLA. Likewise, the liquid assets that were encumbered 
by third-party or used as collateral are excluded from HQLA. The denominator “Total net 
cash outflows” is calculated by subtracting projected inflows over the next 30 days (or 75 
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percent of outflow, whichever is lesser) from projected outflows over the next 30 days. 
That is “Total net cash outflows”. Hence the degree of reliance on projected inflows to 
fund projected outflows is limited to only 75 percent, thus LCR forces the banking 
institutions to maintain liquid asset not less than 25% of their projected outflows (BCBS, 
2013; Hartlage, 2012). 
 
The second standard “net stable funding ratio (NSFR)” is calculated by dividing “the 
available stable funding (ASF) over the required stable funding (RSF). The aim of Basel 
committee for the introduction of NSFR is to induce financial institutions to finance their 
businesses through stable, longer-term sources of financing and to hold fewer illiquid 
assets.  Therefore, holding more liquid assets and unencumbered assets that are not used as 
collateral will prompt banks soundness and resilience during tough times Though that 
would reduce interest income. On the flip side of the coin, holding more longer-term 
liabilities would push up interest expenses. Consequently, banks’ net interest margins 
(NIM) as well as profitability would go down. (BCBS, 2014; Hartlage, 2012; Hong, Huang, 
& Wu, 2014; King, 2013). 
 
While these specific policy prescriptions are new, there were always dozens of liquidity 
ratios developed either by bank supervisors or the banks themselves in a similar spirit to 
proposed LCR and NSFR. For example, DeYoung and Jang (2016) highlighted that the 
American Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPRs) includes three types of liquidity 
ratios to assess short term liquidity risk as LCR almost does. Namely; (short-term 
investments to short-term non-core funds; short-term assets to short-term liabilities; net 
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short-term liabilities to assets). On the other hand, UBPR currently includes two ratios that 
assess bank funding risk in line with the proposed NSFR objectives, namely; “net loans 
and leases to deposits; net loans and leases to core deposits”. 
 
In the literature, several studies have focused on the proposed regulatory requirements of 
Basel III, for instance, King (2013) assessed the impact of the proposed NSFR on banks’ 
net interest margins, Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried (2014) and Gobat, Yanase, and 
Maloney (2014) analyzed NSFR’s cost-benefit and its impact on banks. Cornett et al. 
(2011) studied how US banks managed their liquidity during the crisis and how the credit 
supply was affected.  Silva (2016) examined the impact of the coordinated funding liquidity 
policies among commercial banks on the stability of financial system. Vazquez and 
Federico (2015) analyzed bank funding structures in the period prior to 2008 crisis and 
their implications on the stability of US and Europe financial systems. Bonfim and Kim 
(2013) examined if there is herding for bank liquidity risk, Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi 
(2013) focused on the relationship between Bank regulatory capital and liquidity. Chen, 
Chou, Chang, and Fang (2015) assessed the impact of excess lending on NSFR and 
liquidity creation.  
 
Majority of the above-mentioned studies are done in US and Europe which are not 
applicable to other regions. Thus, there is a need to conduct more studies on the Asian 
emerging economies whose financial systems differ from US financial system in many 
ways. First, financial sectors in Asian emerging countries are smaller compared to US and 
European countries or even the advanced Asian countries. Furthermore, banks play the 
5 
 
main role in Asian financial sectors with small equity and bond markets unlike US where 
equity and bond markets dominate the financial sector. Additionally, Asian banks focus 
more on the traditional banking activities and relying less on investing in interbank or 
derivatives markets in contrast with US banks that are heavily involving in these markets 
(Allen, Chui, & Maddaloni, 2004; Walsh, 2014). These differences have been reflected on 
the structure of Asian banks’ balance sheets which seem to be simpler and stronger with 
less complex securities.   
 
 
Figure 1. 1 
Size of the Financial Markets by Country/region 
Source: (Allen et al., 2004) 
 
When it comes to financial sector, ASEAN countries in turn seem to be more distinguished 
than other regions across the world, they have experienced difficult times during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 which prompted them to carry out some important structural 
banking reforms that include restructuring bank sectors and overhauling regulatory and 
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supervisory systems (Burton, 2007) (more details in chapter two). These reforms have been 
reflected when the global financial crisis occurred in 2008 where ASEAN banks were less 
affected than the regions such as Europe as showed by (Ötker-Robe et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, based on a study done by Gobat, Yanase, and Maloney (2014), the ASEAN 
countries experience a good record in terms of the NSFR as shown in figure 1.2 below.  
 
Even though, the figure shows that ASEAN countries maintain good liquidity 
management; the concern is about how active effective are the ASEAN banks in terms of 
managing their liquidity. In other words, what is the speed of adjustment of ASEAN banks 
toward their target ratios? Accordingly, this study aims to study ASEAN bank liquidity 
management and explores how ASEAN banks have managed their liquidity risk and what 
are the determinants of liquidity and the speed of adjustment. 
 
Dynamic panel data estimation is used in this study to answer the study questions by 
capturing the dynamic of bank liquidity risk management. This study follows DeYoung 
and Jang (2016) where a partial adjustment model is employed. This model allows finding 
the following aspects of bank liquidity management: firstly, estimating liquidity target ratio 
for each banking institution in each time period. Secondly, examining and estimating the 
factors that determine these target ratios. Thirdly, calculating the liquidity adjustment speed 
for each bank in each time period. Lastly, examining the determinant of these speeds of 
adjustment. After getting bank specific speed of adjustment, the impact of these speed on 





Figure 1. 2 
Global Map of Un-Weighted NSFR Average by Country 
Source: ( Gobat et al., 2014)  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The global financial crisis 2007-2008 sparked controversy over the liquidity risk challenges 
faced by financial institutions/markets. These challenges could damage the proper 
functioning of banking sector in particular and financial market in general, causing a huge 
damage for the entire real economy. The liquidity crisis was on degree of length and enough 
severity that leads to huge damage in the economic sectors, resulting in the failure of key 
businesses, consumer wealth to go down by trillions of US dollars, and economic growth 
to slow down causing another great recession.  
 
Prior to the crisis, the main concern of bank managers and supervisors is the bank capital 
adequacy as reflected in Basel II which did not include any liquidity requirements. 
Accordingly, there was an urgent need to make a substantial reassessment of banking 
industry and review its regulatory framework. In response to that, Basel Committee 
introduced in year 2010 Basel III which includes liquidity requirements that were adopted 
to be implemented consistently across jurisdictions for the first time. In the literature, 
several studies have focused on the proposed regulatory requirements of Basel III (King, 
2013; Dietrich, Hess, & Wanzenried 2014; Gobat, Yanase, & Maloney 2014; Cornett et al. 
2011; Silva, 2016; Vazquez & Federico, 2015; Bonfim & Kim, 2013; Distinguin, Roulet, 
& Tarazi, 2013; Chen, Chou, Chang, & Fang, 2015) Besides that, a wide line of literature 
focuses on the determinants of liquidity holdings such as (Angora & Roulet, 2011; Bonner, 
Lelyveld, & Zymek, 2014; Cucinelli, 2013; Delechat, Henao, Muthoora, & Vtyurina, 2012; 
Gregory & Hambusch, 2015; Hackethal, Rauch, Steffen, & Tyrell, 2010; Roman & Sargu, 
2015; Singh & Sharma, 2016; Vodová, 2011).  
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Even though after global financial crisis and introducing Basel III several studies came up, 
the major concerns of these studies were to assess the expected effects of implementing 
NSFR and the determinants of bank liquidity holdings, and mainly focus on the US and 
Europe banks. Therefore, there is a gap in terms of examining how effective are banks 
regarding managing their liquidity risk. In other words, did banks have liquidity targets and 
how fast they adjust their liquidity buffers when they were moved away from their targets. 
The answers of such questions are in need to help in better understanding of bank liquidity 
risk management particularly after the liquidity requirements were set by Basel III. 
However, achieving the high ratios of liquidity for banks is not necessarily a good indicator 
of good liquidity risk management, what is importance is the banks’ ability to adjust 
quickly toward their target ratios. The only study in the literature which highlighted this 
issue is DeYoung & Jang (2016) study. They estimated the liquidity speed of adjustment 
of US commercial banks and examined its determinants on the long-term liquidity buffer 
namely Loans to Core Deposits (LTCD). However, DeYoung and Jang (2016) was 
ignoring the short-term liquidity buffers. Furthermore, their findings cannot be generalized 
because of it being limited to US banks that work in the most sophisticated financial system 
in the world. Thus, there is a need to conduct more studies on the Asian emerging 
economies whose financial systems differ from US financial system in many ways.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
In the light of the statement of the problem and the objectives of the study, the following 
questions are developed to guide the study: 
1. Do ASEAN banks have liquidity targets ratios? 
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2. What is the ASEAN banks’ adjustment speed toward the liquidity target ratios? 
3. What are the relationships between ASEAN banks’ liquidity targets and the 
economic condition, interest rate spread, banks’ size, capital, assets quality, growth 
plan, and funding cost? 
4. What are the relationships between ASEAN banks’ adjustment speeds toward the 
liquidity target ratios and the economic condition, banks’ size, distance from 
liquidity target ratio, the sign of liquidity gaps, and financial crises? 
5.  What is the relationship between ASEAN banks’ adjustment speeds toward their 
liquidity target ratios and their profitability? 
 
1.4 Objective of the Study 
1. To investigate whether ASEAN banks have liquidity targets or not. 
2. To estimate the speed of adjustment of ASEAN banks towards their liquidity target 
ratios. 
3. To examine the relationships between ASEAN banks’ liquidity targets and the 
economic condition, interest rate spread, banks’ size, capital, assets quality, growth 
plan, and funding cost. 
4. To examine the relationships between ASEAN banks’ adjustment speeds toward 
the liquidity target ratios and the economic condition, banks’ size, distance from 
liquidity target ratio, the sign of liquidity gaps, and financial crises. 
5. To examine the relationship between ASEAN banks’ adjustment speeds toward 
their liquidity target ratios and their profitability. 
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
The 2007–08 financial crisis has raised the issue of the importance of understanding the 
challenges posed by bank liquidity risk management. It highlighted the importance of 
liquidity for the adequate functioning of financial markets and banking sectors. During the 
crisis, banks were not able to do their functions smoothly and number of banks cannot 
survive particularly in the US context. The crisis revealed the lack of either liquidity risk 
models or the forecasting models in banking sector. This study contributes to the wide 
literature of bank liquidity, by providing cross-country evidence namely six-ASEAN 
countries. Importantly, this study makes a valuable contribution to the banking literature 
by estimating the speed of adjustment toward liquidity targets which is still largely 
untouched area of research.  
 
This study also enriches the literature by providing empirical evidence about the factors 
that affect the speed of adjustment toward liquidity targets among banks and how the speed 
of adjustment is influencing the banks’ profitability. In the literature, this gap has been 
ignored except for one study done by DeYoung and Jang (2016) in the US context.  
 
The findings of this study might be of interest for regulators in one hand, and for the policy 
makers in ASEAN countries in the other hand, to better understanding of ASEAN banks 
behavior of liquidity management. This means that the policy makers in ASEAN countries 
could be able to predict how banks will behave in the future. For example, policy makers 
in the ASEAN countries could get benefits from the findings of this study, especially after 
“Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025” and the enforcement of the ASEAN 
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Economic Community (AEC) starting from December 31, 2015 that aims to enhance the 
integration of the region’s economies, financial sectors, and in particular banking sectors 
which were be given special attention of the authorities who have announced the ASEAN 
Banking Integration Framework (ABIF) to achieve this objective (Almekinders, Fukuda, 
Mourmouras, Zhou, & Zhou, 2015; Isa, Choong, Fie, & Rashid, 2016).  
 
The findings of this study might also be also of interest for researchers and bankers who 
pay a more attention on the liquidity risk, and how banks can manage their liquidity 
effectively by looking at the determinants of liquidity and the speed of adjustment 
determinants. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The study uses annual secondary data from 1996 to 2015. The sample of study consists of 
87 commercial banks operate in six ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippine). Bank level data is obtained from Thomson Reuters’ 
database “DataStream” which provides data of only six countries out of ten ASEAN 
countries. Therefore, the study is limited to these countries, and limited to banks whose 
data is available by DataStream. Country level data is obtained from World Bank website. 
In this study, STATA 14 Program is used to achieve the study objectives where the 





1.7 Organization of the Study 
The study comprises of five chapters, chapter one is the introduction in which the 
background of study, the problem statement, the study’s questions and objectives, its scope, 
and its significant were presented. The second chapter provides a background about 
banking sector and bank liquidity risk, as well as an overview about ASEAN economies. 
Chapter two further offers a critical review of bank liquidity literature. The third chapter 
presents the research design and methods whereas the empirical method of the study is 
explained, along with brief definitions of the variables and their measurements, the 
hypotheses development and theoretical framework, data collection and sources of the data. 
Chapter four discusses the empirical findings of the study and lastly, chapter five provides 
conclusion to the study which highlights the implications of the study, its limitations, and 








Over the last century, the financial services industry has become more developed, varied 
and complex, which leads to new functions and challenges for the financial institutions. In 
turn, liquidity risk management has rapidly evolved and has drawn growing attention from 
management and regulators. It becomes a key issue in the financial services industry, 
according to Matz and Neu (2007), the element of liquidity crunch was present in the main 
crisis over the nineteenth and the turn of the millennium; Asian and Russian crises, 
LTCM’s downfall (a large hedge fund management firm was called Long-Term Capital 
Management L.P.), and some other cases in the other economic sectors. Lastly, the global 
financial crisis has risen the importance of soundness liquidity management and revealed 
how dangerous liquidity crunch is. 
 
This chapter provides an overview on the banking sector with shedding lights on it role in 
the financial system. This chapter also reviews the liquidity and the liquidity risk aspects 
and discusses the underlying theories of liquidity risk. Then empirical evidences on 
liquidity risk determinants are presented. In the last section, an overview on ASEAN 




2.2 Background about the Banking Sector 
Traditionally, bank – as an essential ingredient of financial institutions - is known as the 
institution that accepts deposits and grants loans. Since the beginnings of the European 
Renaissance, banks have played a critical role in enhancing the economic development. 
Freixas and Rochet (2008) stated that banks, for centuries, has alone performed the 
economic functions of financial sector. However, with the massive developments of 
financial markets, financial system witnessed the emergence of new financial institutions 
and mechanisms. It starts to play an important role in the financial system without affecting 
the importance of banking sectors whose health have been interrelated with the economies’ 
health as the latest financial crisis 2008 has revealed. 
 
Financial systems consist of two wings namely financial markets and financial institutions. 
The main financial institutions that provide financial services are: banks, thrift institutions, 
insurance companies, investment companies, pension funds, finance companies, Securities 
brokers and dealers, and Real estate investment trusts (Saunders & Cornett, 2008). Banks 
are the major players in the financial system due to its roles and functions. The first function 
of banks is offering liquidity and payment services which can be considered as the first 
activity that banks have provided since their first appearance. Banks play this role through 
the traditional activities such as money changing, management of deposits, clearing 
merchants’ positions. By doing this function and providing funds needed by firms, banks 





The second role of banks is to reduce search and transaction costs. Savers and investors 
could suffer some high costs by conducting the required research to make investment 
decisions whether to find the suitable choices for investing their surpluses or financing 
their financial needs. By engaging financial institutions such costs can be avoided which 
allow agent to enjoy economic gains by using financial institutions’ products. Similarly, 
banks minimize transaction costs by minimizing the number of transaction and because of 
their standardized financial products (Matz & Neu, 2007; Saunders & Cornett, 2008). 
 
Another function of banks and financial institutions represented in reducing monitoring 
costs. The ability of financial institutions to monitor assets is higher comparing to the 
individual savers. It can be said that monitoring is costly to the extent that could absorb all 
economic benefits. Accordingly, savers would resort to bank to invest instead doing that 
by themselves to avoid this type of costs. By doing this function, banks help in utilize the 
funds efficiently by borrowers and projects’ managers. 
 
Furthermore, banks can help in terms of overcoming the asymmetric information which 
could cause a large damage among investors. Due to the fact that banks have the abilities 
to know some details which are not available to public or to other agents. Banks also play 
a critical role in managing risk which has gained a growing importance in recent years. On 
one hand, banks offer set of diversified products help individuals to diversifying their 
investments. On the other hand, banks manage their own risks whether come from on-
balance sheet or off-balance sheet activities.  
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Even though banks are doing all previous mentioned functions and play a critical role to 
push up the efficiency of resources allocation either for household, business sectors or on 
macroeconomic level which in turn helps in enhancing economic growth and development. 
Banks are still facing several risks which are threatening the survivals. 
 
2.3 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity can be defined as the capacity of financial institutions to finance the expanding 
of assets and to fulfill their obligations as the liabilities mature (Kumar & Yadav, 2013). 
There are two dimensions of liquidity in banking institutions: liability liquidity and assets 
liquidity. The former refers to banks’ ability to secure their financial needs from money 
market by borrowing, the later refers to the situation that bank sell some of their assets in 
the market to get liquidity (Kumar & Yadav, 2013). In terms of liquidity risk, it refers to 
the situation where banks or any institutions either financial or nonfinancial institution face 
difficulties to fulfill its obligations when they mature without negative effects on the 
financial conditions of the bank. DeYoung and Jang, 2016 defined liquidity risk at banks 
as “the likelihood that the demand for cash by bank customers exceeds the bank’s ready 
supply of cash”. 
 
A soundness bank liquidity risk management is essential for economies and the bank itself 
as well. As for banks to be able to not only to avoid the high costs of getting liquidity 
during hard times, but also to survive. Liquidity crises could cause a huge damage for banks 
to the extent of collapsing as the global financial crisis has revealed.  On the other flip of 
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coin, any disruption in the banking sector by collapsing of banks or their failure to fulfill 
the obligations will lead to instability for the financial system and thus, affecting the 
economy as a whole. 
 
According to Saunders and Cornett (2008), both sides of balance sheet contribute in banks’ 
liquidity risk namely the liability-side liquidity risk and the asset-side liquidity risk. The 
first type occurs when depositors unexpectedly withdraw their deposits immediately and 
not wait till these deposits’ due dates. This type of risk arises particularly from institutional 
depositors (the whole sale deposits) who look for higher return and whose withdrawals are 
large to the extent that could affect bank’s ability to pay them. The second type arises 
because of the unexpected drawing down loans commitments by clients who have line of 
credit. Lines of credit allow customers to get funds from banks on demand (borrowing fund 
by drawing down these lines of credit). Thus, to faces unexpected demand for funds, banks 
might borrow the required funds from money market or liquidate assets to fill funds gap.  
 
To minimize the exposure to such risk, banks adjust the portion of balance sheet items in 
both sides. On the asset side, the higher portion of liquid assets (cash and equivalent, 
government securities and high quality short term assets) the more liquid and the less 
exposure to liquidity risk. On the liability side, the higher percent of core deposits and long 
term liabilities the lower exposure to liquidity risk. Although maintaining a large portion 
of liquid asset reduces liquidity risk, it has a cost represented in the low return comparing 
to the higher return of illiquid (long term assets). On the other side, using more capital and 
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long term liabilities is considered costly comparing to using short term liabilities. 
Accordingly, banks need to tradeoff between the costs and benefits of these choices. 
 
Acharya (2006) differentiates between the two types of liquidity risk concerning banks. 
The first occurs because of the idiosyncratic -bank specific- shocks, this type is called 
funding liquidity. The other type caused by financial market as transaction cost of securities 
goes up, market prices go down and thus, banks face difficulties to liquidate assets without 
bearing noticeable losses or to borrow from money markets at reasonable costs, this type 
of risk is called market liquidity risk. 
 
In the liquidity risk literature review, several theories have been developed. In the 
following section, the main underlying theories in the banking sectors are elaborated and 
the light would be shed to the underlying theories of banks’ liquidity risk. 
 
2.4 The Underlying Theories in the Banking Literature 
2.4.1 General Banking Theories  
In the banking literature, several theories are developed. Werner (2016) reviewed the 
literature of banking over the last century which tried to answer some questions such as: 
why banks exist, how do they operate and do they create money? Based on his review, 
there are three lines of banking literature that were dominant over the last century. First, 
the credit creation theory which considered as the oldest theory of banking, it was prevalent 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, the second theory which is the fractional 
reserve theory that was dominant for a while before the third theory “financial 
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intermediation theory” came up and which is currently prevalent. In this section, these three 
theories are elaborated with other underlying theories related with banks.  
 
To start with the credit creation theory, which is the oldest theory that was prevalent until 
the twenties of last century. It considers banks as non- financial intermediaries. It states 
that banks can give credit and create money from nothing either aggregately or 
individually; through transactions of granting loans and buying assets without the need to 
collect money for each transaction since these transactions do not go away from the bank 
in form of cash; instead, these financing transactions take the form of deposits held by the 
borrowers. Accordingly, banks’ balance sheet as well as money supply tends to grow as a 
result of the increasing in banks’ lending. Werner (2016) quoted the views of this theory 
supporters, on the top of those is Henry D. Macleod who has emphasized that the role of 
bank in creating credit not lending money, where bank’s job is not limited to borrow from 
one side and to lend to the other. According to Macleod (1866) and Schumpeter (1954), 
banks gather some sums from a big number of customers, however, the essence of the 
bank’ work is not to lend these sums to others, but to create double amounts of credit in 
form of deposits held by the borrowers who get promises from bankers to be paid at any 
time.  
 
The second theory is the fractional reserve theory, Werner (2014) attributed the beginning 
of this theory to Alfred Marshall in the late nineteenth century. However, Marshall’s 
arguments were not very popular at that time. By the end of the first world war, the theory 
started to gain more supporters among the economists who viewed that the credit creation 
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theory was mistaken in relation to the view of banks can individually create credit.  The 
fractional reserve theory states that “each bank is a financial intermediary, and the banking 
system collectively creates credit or money by multiplying the deposit expansion”. 
 
According to Werner (2014) and (2016), the fractional reserve theory had been mainly 
pushed by Phillips (1920) who argued that what is true for banking system as a whole in 
the process of creating credit and money is not true for banks as individual. Later, the 
fractional reserve theory has gained supporting from some influential economist such like 
Crick (1927), Keynes (1930) and others (Werner, 2016).   
 
The third theory is the the financial intermediation theory, this theory argues that banks are 
just financial intermediaries unvaried from non-bank financial intermediaries that rise 
funds by accepting deposits then lend these sums out. This theory has highlighted the 
creation of liquidity that banks are doing by lending long and borrow short. Although the 
domination of the financial intermediation theory has started only with the late sixties of 
last century, it has some root on the early literature of some economists such like John 
Maynard Keynes in his most influential book “General Theory”, Keynes argued that there 
is a need to gather saving before investments to take place. 
 
The argument of this theory has raised an important question: why do we need banks since 
they do not differ from the other non-bank financial institutions? And moreover, why do 
we need financial intermediaries in present of perfect financial markets. In the financial 
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markets literature, the answers of this question vary from researcher providing us a huge 
line of literature based on the assumptions of the intermediation theory.  
 
The early related literature emphasized the reduction of transaction costs. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) stated that the borrowers as well as depositors can use to perform their 
investment decisions or to get financial needs 
  
The early related literature also has emphasized on the role of banks in decreasing 
transaction costs. According to Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), among those who have 
highlighted the reduction of transaction costs were Benston and Smith (1976), Fama 
(1980), and Gurley and Shaw (1962). Another justification has been introduced by  Leland 
and Pyle (1976) in which banks help to overcome the problem of asymmetric information. 
Their paper argued that financial intermediaries have the abilities to effectively assess the 
assets and projects, find out their qualities, aquire these assets to establish diversified 
portfolios, and then sell claims on these portfolios to the investors. This rationale of 
financial intermediaries’ ability to establish diversified portfolios had given the financial 
mediation theory a large impetus. Leland and Pyle (1976) viewed that banks are able to get 
special information about borrowers at lower cost comparing to individuals. 
 
The views of Leland & Pyle have been formalized by  Diamond (1984) and Ramakrishnan 
and Thakor (1984), both articles highlighted the benefits of diversification as it helps to 
bring down the monitoring costs, while Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) limited their 
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study to non-depository financial intermediaries, Diamond (1984) dealt with depository 
financial intermediaries. 
 
The second line of financial intermedation literature tried to answer why banks finance 
illiquid assets with short term liabilities. Bryant (1980) provided an explaintion of deposit 
contracts’ role in which they serve investors to time their consumptions and money 
withdrawal. Deposits help in providing an insurance against random shocks raisied by 
some tiny risks that are suronding individuals income and properties which create liquidity 
needs for individuals leading to increasing demand of withdrawals. Deposits can play such 
role as they have a fixed price the issuer commits to pay where as the long term debt cannot 
play the same role due to the need of selling the calims of these debt contracts in the 
financial markets and at market prices. This indicates that nontraded instruments are 
serving to provide deposits with an insurance against preference shocks which raised the 
question of why? 
 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) answered that non-tradable deposit contracts which 
promise a “first come, first served" payoff offers unique economic benefits. They referred 
to the explaination of nontraded aspects of deposit provided by Bryant (1980), Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), and Jacklin (1987) who argued that suppose there is no overall shocks 
influence the prices of traded debt contracts in secondary markets, non-traded instruments 
(deposits) would help in providing an “ex ante Pareto-superior allocation” when individual 
shocks could take place affecting the planed consumption and then creating financial needs. 




Furthermore, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Subrahmanyam (1991) suggested that 
financial intermediaries introduce liquid securities to satisify the demand of uniformed 
investors. Liquid securities provide almost no private information, these securities could 
be traded as diversified portfolios. Thus, deposit contracts provide a protection against the 
losses in trading illiquid instruments to those investors who suffer lack of information while 
this type of securities is considered as information-sensitive instruments. 
 
Additionally, banks use short term liabilities to finance long term loans and illiquid assets. 
This process has been named as “maturity transformation” where banks enjoy twofold 
gain: the first is due to the high risk of long term assets, and the second is due to process 
of creating liquidity (Thakor, 1992). That gains encourage banks to maintain high maturity 
mismatch which positively influences the expected value but leads to higher volatility of 
banks’ return on equity (Deshmukh, Greenbaum, & Kanatas, 1983; Niehans & Hewson, 
1976). Flannery (1994) has attributed the longer maturity of loans to borrower’s 
technologies, which characterized as longer and less liquid. The author suggested that the 
repricing of short-term deposits allows depositors to get payoff information. This puts 
banking institutions under frequent market reevaluation leading to optimal short term 
liabilities. On other hand, Diamond (1991) refered to the limited ablilty of deopositors to 
only assess bank’s prospects while bank insiders earn non marketable control rents. Thus, 
at the time of refinancing, if banks were undervalued they could suffer “dissipative 




Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) also reviewed the previous banking literature and 
suggested that the most important type of transaction cost is the cost of asymmetric 
information. Then, they concluded that theories built on information-based give a more 
substantial interpretation. Allen and Anthony (1998) argued that although the emphasizing 
of intermediaries’ role in minimizing transaction costs and asymmetric information is very 
strong, but as time is passing, financial industry has largely developed which makes such 
a role less relevant. Allen and Anthony (1998) viewed that intermediaries currently 
concentrate on two distinct functions; facilitating the transactions of risk transfer and 
dealing with the growing sophisticated, varied financial instruments and markets. Risk 
management has gained growing significance that made it among the most important 
activities of financial institutions. Nevertheless, the traditional financial intermediation 
theory has not provided sufficient explanation about this role. Moreover, the authors 
highlighted the participation in such activities as a very significant service provided by 
financial intermediaries. This participation has some costs represented in the involving in 
such new activities and financial markets accompanied with learning costs (how to deal 
with these new instruments and markets). 
 
According to Berger and Bouwman (2009), the modern financial intermediation theory has 
attributed the existence of banks to the role of creating liquidity and transforming risk. 
While traditional financial intermediation theory focused on creating liquidity by using the 
items of balance sheet (using liquid liabilities to finance illiquid assets). The modern 
financial intermediation theory has introduced the role of creating liquidity by using off-
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balance sheet items; such as loan commitments and claims comparable to liquid liabilities  
(Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2002). 
 
2.4.2 Risk Management and Liquidity Risk Management Theories  
Turning into bank liquidity literature, Acharya and Naqvi (2012) suggested that bank 
liquidity tends to grow when macroeconomic risk goes up due to the shift of investors from 
using direct investment channels into banks deposits seeking insurance for their savings. 
Acharya and Naqvi (2002) added that banks gather deposits from savers and then use them 
to finance investment projects. Therefore, banks are subjected to unexpected withdrawals 
which could lead to liquidity shortfalls. These shortfalls of liquidity cause banks to suffer 
a panalty cost. This cost represented in the cost of getting liquidity by liquidating a share 
of bank’s assets or borrowing from money markets. Therefore, banks set aside a specific 
ratio of deposits as reserves in form of cash and high quality and liquid assets and use the 
rest  of deposits to grant loans to borrowers or invest in their projects.  
 
Similarly, Gatev and Strahan (2006) have reached the same conclusion, they found that 
banks’ deposits tend to increase when spreads of commercial paper market raise which 
lead to assets growth. Commercial paper spreads indicate that the investors’ evaluation of 
risk, when macroeconomic risk is high the spreads on commercial paper increase, while 
during times of low macroeconomic risk commercial paper spreads tend to squeeze. 
Kowalik (2014) provided a generic model of liquidity provision in which banks that suffer 
liquidity shortage can choose between cash, borrowing from money market, or liquidating 
a share of their assets. Kowalik (2014) referred to the effect of asymmetric information that 
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influences the performance of money market. With symmetric information, illiquid banks 
find it the same whether to sell assets or to borrow from interbank market, but with the 
asymmetries of information, it is better for bank to borrow rather than liquidating assets 
due to higher cost of selling assets. 
 
Kowalik (2014) focused on the three alternatives of dealing with different liquidity 
positions and credit risk whereas banks’ decisions regarding the allocation of fund sources 
between risky assets, liquid – less risky – assets, or cash reserves. These decisions affect 
assets quality and create liquidity need. To deal with such situations, banks choose whether 
to use their cash reserves, or they could resort to interbank markets borrowing their 
liquidity needs or lending surplus, or banks may go to secondary markets seeking liquidity 
by selling assets or investing their liquidity excess by buying assets. According to  Kowalik 
(2014), the bank liquidity literature have mainly focused on one of the two approaches 
mentioned above: interbank markets approach and secondary markets. Kowalik (2014) 
tried to link the two directions of literature to provide better understanding of bank liquidity 
risk management. 
 
Liquidity risk emerges when banks do their main and traditional job, whereas the existence 
of banks has been mainly attributed to the joint issuance of loans and deposits as well as 
the interrelationships among them. Banks invest, by their nature, in range of assets that 
have uneven degree of liquidity. According to Vento and Ganga (2009), the large 
proportion of these assets are illiquid and difficult to liquidate without significant losses, 
whereas the liabilities are exposed to withdrawal at any time. Therefore, there are many 
factors that should be considered when analyzing the liquidity of banks. On one hand, 
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traditional financial intermediation is based on different degree of discretionary power as 
far as the timing of use of funds. Therefore, banks should preserve their depositors' 
confidence that they can withdraw their funds on demand as well as at due dates. On the 
other side, contemporary banking is based on more innovative financial services, which 
can also affect the capability of a bank to be liquid, as it has been demonstrated in year 
2007 during the global financial crisis. 
 
The banking literature distinguishes between two concepts of liquidity namely market 
liquidity and funding liquidity. Bonner, Lelyveld, and Zymek (2014) defined them as 
follows; funding liquidity means the ease of attracting money by banks and bank is deemed 
to have high funding liquidity when it has the ability to easily raise fund with rational costs. 
The ease of collecting money by selling banks' asset rather than borrowing against assets 
is referred as market liquidity, the easier raising funds the higher market liquidity. In case 
of high market liquidity, bank can sell the asset at fair price, while low market liquidity 
causes depress asset price. 
 
Liquidity risk indicates the probability where bank will not be able to fulfill its obligations 
at some point of time. Given that the main activity of bank is to borrow short and lend long, 
banks are particularly exposed to liquidity risk. Saunders and Cornett, (2008) attributed 
bank liquidity risk to the two sides of balance sheet, asset-side liquidity risks in tandem 
with liabilities-side liquidity risks. The liabilities-side liquidity risk arises when banks' 
depositors withdraw their deposits more than the expectation. The second type of liquidity 
risk came from the asset-side liquidity in which borrowers may need funds so they resort 
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to take down their loan commitments at banks more than the expectation. These 
phenomena create a demand for liquidity on demand, whether because of liability 
withdrawals or loan commitments takedowns. 
 
 Kashyap et al. (2002) argued that the two banking functions, deposit-taking and granting 
loans, in a sense are two different aspects for the same function, which is to provide 
liquidity on demand. They emphasized the concept in which loan-commitments and 
demand deposits are acknowledged as an identical service. Therefore, they believe that 
there may be synergies between the two functions since the withdrawals of demand 
deposits and the takedowns of loan commitments are not positively correlated. Evan Gatev, 
Schuermann, and Strahan (2009) completed the model of Kashyap et al. (2002) by 
explaining how banks could provide a liquidity insurance to companies that need to 
borrow. During stress times whereas markets suffer tight liquidity, investors head to banks 
seeking the safety for their funds. At these times, depositing money with banks is deemed 
more safe than investing in financial markets. While borrowers come to banks seeking 
funds, investors go to banks depositing their money creating a natural liquidity hedge. 
 
Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi (2013) highlighted the theoretical and empirical literature 
referring to a causal relationship which makes liquidity creation to be affected by bank 
capital. Two conflicting views has been developed, the first was introduced by  Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) who argued that liquidity creation is impeded by the capitalization 
because of the impact of two factors which are the fragile financial structure and the 
crowding out of deposits. On one hand, there is a negative relationship between capital and 
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the monitoring, consequently monitoring in turn affect liquidity creation where lower 
monitoring decreases liquidity creation (Diamond & Rajah, 2000, 2001). On the other 
hand, high levels of capitalization would crowd out deposits causing liquidity creation to 
decrease (Gorton & Winton, 2000). On contrast, the second view states that high level of 
capitalization enhance banks’ ability to manage risks  leading to create more liquidity 
(Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden, 2004). Distinguin et al. 
(2013) argued that higher liquidity creation exposes banks to liquidity risk in which they 
could find it difficult to cope with liquidity shocks. 
 
2.4.3 The Determinants of Liquidity Buffers 
In the literature several studies have examined the liquidity buffers. A recent study done 
by Singh and Sharma, (2016), investigated bank-specific and macroeconomic factors that 
determine the liquidity of Indian banks. The study used OLS, fixed effect and random 
effect estimates over 14 years (from 2000 to 2013) for a sample of 59 banks. They 
incorporated 6 bank specific determenants, namely; size of bank, profitability, funding 
cost, bank cabital, bank deposits, and the type of ownership. They also considered three 
country – specific factors, namely; GDP growth, infaltion rates and unemployment level. 
The result suggested that all above mentiond factors affect bank liquidty buffers exept 
funding cost,as a bank specific factor and unemployment as a country specific factors. 
Their findings revealed that bank size and GDP negatively affect bank liquidity whereas 





Silva (2016) examined whether the competitors’ choices and the coordinated funding 
liquidity policies have effects on bank liquidity. He developed a new identification strategy 
in order to examine how interacted are the liquidity risk management of commercial banks 
by using data of 2,047 commercial banks operate in OECD countries (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) for period from 1999 to 2014. The results 
revealed that there is an interaction among banks when determining liquidity buffers and 
choosing liquidity choices. He suggested that banks’ strategic liquidity decisions affect 
individually and aggregately default risk. 
  
Another study done by Bonfim and Kim (2013) tested how European and U.S. banks 
manage their liquidity risk during the period covered 2002 through 2009. By using data of 
almost 3500 banks, they examined whether banks tend to bear high degree of liquidity risk 
exposure during crisis period. They used a set of bank factors as independent variable, 
namely; bank size, solvency, bank’s profitability, bank’s efficiency, and bank’s 
specialization. They found that large, more efficient banks tend to bear high level of 
liquidity risk exposure, profitability was significant for some test and insignificant at others 
(five measures of liquidity have been considered as dependent variable), and finally bank 
capital was not statistically significant at all tests. Chen, Chou, Chang, and Fang (2015) 
investigated the effects of excess lending on bank liquidity in China over period (2006 – 
2012) using 93 bank-level data. They considered some bank indicators such as lending 
ratio, assets quality represented by non-performing loan ratio, and the diversification. They 
found that excess lending leads banks to bear higher liquidity risk and heightens liquidity 
maturity mismatch. On the other side, bank capital was found having a negative 
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relationship with liquidity in some types of banks (joint-venture banks, state-owned banks 
and city commercial banks). 
 
Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried (2014) analyzed selected factors that affect NSFR for 
Western European banks by using data of 921 banks covers 15-year time period (1996-
2010). They calculated the NSFR over the period of study for each bank, the majority were 
found less than the required NSFR (100%), especially large, faster growing banks, 
investment banks and banks with active asset management. They found that safer and 
adequate banks are less exposed to liquidity risk, while faster growing banks expose highly 
to liquidity risk. Banks involved heavily in traditional banking activities (mainly granting 
loans and accepting deposits) have higher NSFR than those which involve heavily in non-
traditional activities that have high ratio of non-interest income. 
 
 Another study done by Gobat, Yanase, and Maloney (2014) discussed the potential effects 
of introducing the NSFR by using data of over 2000 banks at the end of 2012. The sample 
covers 128 countries and they found that majority of banks had NSFR higher than or equal 
to the required ratio, their calculations revealed that larger bank had lower level of NSFR. 
They argued that NSFR is relatively consistent with the regulatory measure for capturing 
banks’ funding risk. 
 
Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005) analyzed the bank liquidity in UK, by using quarterly 
panel data of 57 banks cover 19-year period (1985 – 2003). Their results reveal that in 
presence of UK central bank’s support during liquidity crisis, banks tend to have higher 
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exposure to liquidity risk. They found that bank liquidity is negatively related with country 
specific factors. In other words, banks tend to maintain higher levels of liquidity when 
economic growth suffers slowing, and decrease the liquidity holdings when economy 
grows fast. Additionally, banks were found to maintain larger liquidity holdings if short 
term interest rates go down and vice versa. Furthermore, bank liquidity holdings are 
negatively related to some bank specific factors such as loan growth and net interest 
margins, while bank size and profitability were found insignificant. 
 
For the OECD countries, Bonner et al. (2014) used Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) alongside OLS to examine the determinants of bank liquidity holdings. Using data 
of 7000 banks for a period of 10 years, they found that bank capital, profitability, deposits, 
the disclosure, the concentration, state-underwritten deposits to savings ratio, and the 
financial openness have impact on liquidity holdings. Interestingly, the results revealed 
that most of these determinants turn insignificant with the presence of bank liquidity 
regulations, but disclosure requirements probable complement these regulations. 
Moreover, they found that liquidity regulation is positively related with bank lending and 
interest rates. On the other side, with the presence of liquidity regulation at stress time, 
liquidity holdings go up while lending volumes go down. Cucinelli (2013) used OLS 
regression and panel data of 1080 Eurozone banks over 5-year time period 2006-2010, to 
examine the factors that determine bank liquidity holdings. He found that bank size, bank 
capitalization and bank specialization determine bank liquidity holdings. While larger 
banks tend to maintain less liquidity buffers, banks with high total capital ratio maintain 
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higher levels of liquidity buffers. Assets quality affects only short-term liquidity risk, banks 
that more focus on granting loans seems to have higher liquidity risk exposure. 
 
Using a panel data of 96 commercial banks from Central America, Panama and the 
Dominican Republic for a five-year time period (2006-2010), Delechat, Henao, Muthoora, 
& Vtyurina, (2012) studied the factors that affect the ratio of liquid assets to deposits. Their 
results revealed that bank size, bank capital, profitability, and financial development affect 
banks’ holdings of precautionary liquidity levels. Moreover, they found that liquidity 
holdings are positively related to deposit dollarization. Munteanu (2012) also studied the 
determinants of bank liquidity by using data of 27 Romanian commercial banks. He 
observed that the influence of Tier 1 Capital Ratio and Z-score mainly affect liquidity 
buffers over the period of 2002-2010, while the test of crisis year revealed that only Z- 
score affects liquidity buffers. He found also that the impaired loans indicator had a 
constant significant negative impact on liquidity buffers for all tests. 
 
For 86 banks operate in CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries, Roman and Sargu 
(2015) examined the factors that might influence bank liquidity holdings, by using a panel 
data of over the period (2004-2011). Their results suggested that bank capitalization 
positively influences overall bank liquidity buffer, whereas assets quality negatively affects 
bank liquidity. Furthermore, the profitability represented by the return on equity influences 
bank liquidity. The same authors have Roman and Şargu (2014) have assessed a set of bank 
specific factors that might affect liquidity risk management in Bulgarian and Romanian 
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commercial banks over a period of 9 years (2003- 2011). They found that capital adequacy 
and assets quality affect bank liquidity holdings. 
 
 Vodová (2011) studies the Czech commercial banks’ liquidity holdings, using panel data 
over 9 year (2001-2009). The results showed that bank liquidity is positively related to 
capital adequacy and interest rates on loans and interbank transaction, while it is negatively 
related to assets quality, inflation rate, business cycle and financial crisis. Furthermore, 
bank size have an ambiguous relationship with bank liquidity holdings. Hackethal, Rauch, 
Steffen, and Tyrell, (2010) used a multivariate dynamic panel regression and data over the 
period (1997-2006). They examined whether the average volume of loans affects liquidity 
creation on German savings banks. They found that banks that lend more create more 
liquidity. Angora and Roulet (2011) analyzed US and European listed commercial banks 
over the period of 2005-2009. They argued that liquidity risk that arises from liquidity 
transformation tend to decrease when banks maintain higher provision for loan loss and 
when banks concentrate their lending in liquid loans. 
 
2.4.4 The Determinants of Adjustment Speeds 
While there is an abundance of the empirical studies that have examined the adjustment 
speed of banks’ capital ratios, there is (to the best of my knowledge) only an empirical 
study has analyzed the determinants of adjustment speeds toward target liquidity target 
ratios (DeYoung & Jang, 2016). These studies such as Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) 
focused on a set of bank specific and macroeconomic factors such as the profitability, bank 




 In US context, DeYoung and Jang (2016) examined the factors that affect banks’ 
adjustment speeds toward liquidity target ratios, namely the distance between banks’ 
liquidity actual ratios and target ratios, bank size, the economic condition, and the sign of 
liquidity gap (whether it is above target ratio or not). They reported that larger banks adjust 
their liquidity levels abit faster than small ones. They found a weak evidence that banks 
adjustment speeds twoard liquidity target ratios are affected by a helthy economic 
conditions. Regading the distance between the actual and target ratios (liquidity gap), they 
found that banks operate a way of their target tend to allocate a significant amount of funds 
to close these gaps when they first occur. Additionally, DeYoung and Jang (2016) also 
reported that banks operate above their target ratio adjust faster than those that operate 
under their targets. 
 
2.5 Background of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  
2.5.1 An Overview on ASEAN Economies 
On August1967, five eastern Asian countries singed The Bangkok Declaration establishing 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These countries are Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Later, and at different dates, other five 
eastern Asian countries have joined making up ASEAN’s ten members, these countries are 
Brunei Darussalam (joined on 7 January 1984), Viet Nam (28 July 1995), Lao PDR and 
Myanmar (23 July 1997), and the last one was Cambodia (30 April 1999). In the following 
table, an economic overview is presented for the ASEAN countries. This overview includes 




Based on Table 2.1, these countries are having a combined nominal GDP higher than 
USD2,442 billion in 2015. This made ASEAN countries ranked as the sixth largest 
economy in the world. While Indonesia is the largest economy among ASEAN countries, 
Singapore is the most developed economy and it has so far higher GDP per capita. This 
research paper will be limited to six ASEAN countries which account for 95 percent of the 
ASEAN combined GDP as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2. 1 







Indonesia 861,933,968,740.33 4.79 3,346.49 257,563,815.00 
Thailand 395,281,580,952.88 2.82 5,816.44 67,959,359.00 
Malaysia 296,217,641,787.22 4.95 9,766.17 30,331,007.00 
Singapore 292,739,307,535.64 2.01 52,888.74 5,535,002.00 
Philippines 291,965,336,390.95 5.81 2,899.38 100,699,395.00 
Vietnam 193,599,379,094.86 6.68 2,111.14 91,703,800.00 
Myanmar 64,865,515,159.23 6.99 1,203.51 53,897,154.00 
Cambodia 18,049,954,289.43 7.04 1,158.69 15,577,899.00 
Brunei Darussalam 15,492,035,784.42 -0.50 36,607.93 423,188.00 
Lao PDR 12,327,488,340.73 7.00 1,812.33 6,802,023.00 





For the banking industry in these countries, it is not at same level across ASEAN countries 
where it seems to be good established and high sophisticated in Singapore while the picture 
looks quite the opposite in some other countries such as Myanmar and Cambodia. 
Yamanaka, (2014) highlighted the similarities and differences of ASEAN members’ 
financial sectors, where Malaysia and Singapore have well developed, fairly large capital 
markets comparable to those in developed countries. In contrast, the size of financial 
markets is still very small in Laos, Cambodia, Brunei and Myanmar. The other four 
countries come in between. On the same vein, Singaporean and Malaysian commercial 
banks have high average of assets exceed 14 billion dollars in 2009. Average of near 10 
billion dollars in Thailand, followed by Philippine, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei (1.8 to 
3 billion). Furthermore, it did not exceed even USD200 million in the other three countries.  
 
 Based on the Table 2.2 shown below, the accessibility to banks in ASEAN countries is 
largely low even in Singapore and Malaysia comparing to developed countries. According 
to Financial Access Survey (2015) conducted by International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
extensiveness of ASEAN commercial banks' branch networks is still low, whether banks 
branches or ATMs. In (2014) ASEAN countries had in average 44.23 ATMs, 10.66 
branches per 1000 adults comparing to five advanced countries’ averages at 122.3 and 29.7 
respectively. In comparing between ASEAN countries with each other’s; Laos, Cambodia 
and Myanmar are the lowest in terms of the accessibility to banks as well as the smallest 
percent of adults have deposit accounts with commercial banks. These countries, 
accompanied with Indonesia and Philippine had low levels of outstanding loans and 
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Table 2. 2 
Financial Accessibility Indicators for ASEAN Countries 












Deposit a/c with 
commercial 


















banks (% of 
GDP) 
Brunei  79.27108 608.9272 19.73944 1930.724 1582.069 775.4341 56.31782 25.59573 
Cambodia 10.87709   5.672926 216.1644   42.42564 53.53715 50.74903 
Laos 19.92495 43.23299 2.902362 465.5666 395.3375 82.68347     
Myanmar 1.641345 1.862757 3.3061 171.918 171.7879 1.865515 25.60441 10.50461 
Indonesia 49.47905 396.062 10.95108 901.3954   220.5386 39.02627 34.8517 
Malaysia 52.17454 394.0555 10.76383 2469.452 832.8759 732.162 107.1304 112.9948 
Philippines 23.35951   8.681494 530.7955 455.6038   45.85557 24.89119 
Singapore 59.46432 1156.053 9.389103   2253.204   141.0828 155.6569 
Thailand 111.3094 309.571 12.60891 1514.503 1180.076 416.4733 75.89852 74.10304 
Vanuatu 34.82575 81.7733 22.60619 784.3858 654.5102 156.1477 69.09707 70.06788 
ASEAN 
average 44.2327 373.942 10.6621 998.323 940.683 303.466 68.1722 62.1572 
         
France 108.4973   38.15447       35.58369 38.68529 
Germany 123.1982   14.53568       28.01118 21.36086 
Japan 127.4544   33.88086 7246.883   188.9086 141.3196 101.4563 
UK  129.9667           129.8377 124.7756 
US     32.22736       57.9754 43.59643 
Average  122.279 N.A 29.6996  N.A  78.5455 65.9749 
Source: IMF, Financial Access Survey 2015
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2.5.2 Banks' Financial Soundness of the 6-ASEAN Countries 
In this section, the banks’ financial soundness to the 6-ASEAN countries is elaborated. 
These countries which are Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
Philippine accounted to more than 95 percent of ASEAN GDP in 2015. It is noticeable that 
the amount of variance in the bank size among these countries. Singapore significantly sat 
on the top of banking industry by banks aggregate assets of approximately USD1,7 trillion 
in 2015, Malaysia came second. In the third and fourth Thailand and Indonesia came by a 
tight difference, and finally Vietnam and Philippine that had the lower banks size. 
  
Table 2. 3 
Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators of the 6- ASEAN Countries 
 Singapore Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Vietnam * Philippine 
Banks size ** 
Total Assets 
(USDMillion) 
1,691,402 603,182 464,880 456,411 292,294 236,134 
Asset Quality       
NPL to Gross Loans 1.07 1.66 2.88 2.98 3.44 1.95 
Capital Adequacy       
Capital to RWA 16.56 16.77 17.36 21.17 13.03 15.28 
Tier 1 Capital to 
RWA 
14.38 14.19 14.22 19.79 10.79 12.84 
Capital to Assets 9.32 10.86 10.16 14.67 8.74 10.59 
Earnings and profitability      
ROA (2016Q2) 1.24 1.40 1.40 2.20 0.47 1.46 
ROE 2016Q2 13.30 13.35 11.02 15.42 5.37 14.19 
Interest Margin to 
Gross Income 
60.38 59.30 N.A 68.40 74.47 68.11 
Liquidity       
Liquid Assets to 
Short Term Liabilities 
76.43 133.09 166.79 32.63 N.A 59.80 
Liquid Asset Ratio 69.16 22.08 18.93 22.15 15.31 37.80 
Non-interbank loans 
to customer deposits 
87.77 N.A 97.6*** 98.38 77.96 77.38 
*  2015Q2; ** 2015Q4 
Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators database & IMF Country Report No. 16/139 
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While Singapore came first in the asset quality indicator followed by Malaysia and 
Philippine, Indonesian banks were significantly more solvent and profitable and on the 
opposite end Vietnamese banks were low solvent and less profitable. The other countries 
came in between by convergent ratios as shown in Table 2.3. In terms of the liquidity, 
ASEAN countries banks’ liquidity varied largely with high liquidity ratios recorded by 
Singaporean banks. The lower ratio of Interest Margin to Gross Income for Singapore and 
Malaysia reflected their diversification of income source by relying (more than the others) 
on nontraditional business activities. 
 
2.5.3 Banking Sector Reforms Following ASEAN Crisis in 1997  
Following ASEAN financial crisis in 1997, a set of bank restructuring strategies have been 
developed and imposed by ASEAN authorities targeting the reform of banking sectors and 
aiming to overcome the effects of crisis, recover banks’ soundness, enhance bank 
competition and efficiency, and to avoid the possibility of recurrence of the crisis again. 
These measures (which contained legal and institutional framework) ranging from 
strengthening viable financial institutions, shutting down insolvent ones, dealing with 
impaired assets, improving prudential regulations and banking supervision, and promoting 
transparency in the financial system. In the literature, several studies have studies these 
reforms (Ilene Grabel et al., 2007; Lindgren et al., 1999; Randhawa & Maru, n.d.; 
Takatoshi & Hashimoto, 2007) 
 
The government intervention to strengthening banking sector by encouraging or even 
enforcing- mergers and acquisitions between banking institutions or closing insolvent ones, 
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has led to less numbers but stronger commercial banks. Lindgren et al., (1999) summarized 
the number of merger transactions over period of two years ( June 1997- June 1999), where 
four Indonesian commercial banks, fifteen Malaysian finance companies and commercial 
banks, four Philippines commercial banks, and seventeen Thai finance companies and 
commercial banks were involved in merger transactions. Takatoshi and Hashimoto (2007) 
illustrated that because of merger transactions, the number of domestic commercial banks 
has decreased from 23 banks in 2006 to only 10 banks. On same context, policies taken by 
ASEAN countries has succeed in reducing the ratios of non- performing loans (NPL) in all 










3.1  Introduction 
This chapter deals with the methodology used in the research. In particular, it explains the 
research framework, discussions and development of hypotheses, model specification, 
variables definition and measurement, sample description, sources and methods of data 
collection, as well as the statistical techniques used for data analysis. 
 
 3.2  Research framework 
The main aim of study is to examine whether ASEAN banks manage their liquidity or not. 
if so, how effective the liquidity risk has been managed. To achieve that, the process of 
research will go through three stages; the first stage is examining whether banks had 
liquidity targets or not and what are the factors that determine these targets (NSFR and 
Short-term liquidity ratio). This means in the first stage the NSFR and Short-term liquidity 
ratio represent the dependent variable of first regression. The independent variables are a 
set of bank specific and macroeconomic factors (bank size, capital, assets quality, growth 
plan, cost of funding, economic condition, and interest rate spread). This stage is illustrated 
in the figure 3.1. 
 
The second stage examines how quickly banks adjust their liquidity buffers ratios when 
they move away from target ratios, and what are the factors that affect these adjustment 
speeds. The size and sign of gap between target and actual liquidity ratios accompanied 
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with the economic condition, bank size, and the financial stress as independent variables 
in this stage, while the change of liquidity target ratio is considered as the dependent 
variable. Figure 3.2 illustrates the second stage. The final stage is designed to test how 
effective bank liquidity risk management was in the sense that relates to maximizing profits 
in which the profitability represents the dependent variable, the adjustment speed is the 
independent variable along with bank size, bank capital and loan loss reserve ratio as a 











Figure 3. 1 





Figure 3. 2 
Research Framework A: Determinants of Adjustment Speeds 
  
 
Figure 3. 3 
Research framework (c): The Effect of Adjustment Speeds on Banks' Profitability 
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3.3  Hypotheses Development 
Liquidity as a subject of study has gained considerable attention of researchers and policy 
makers in recent years. The major empirical studies examined the determinants of liquidity 
buffers, but after liquidity requirements were introduced in Basel III, researcher has mainly 
focused on the impact of imposing the new introduced NSFR and LCR on banks’ financial 
situation. Only one study -to the best of my knowledge- namely DeYoung and Jang (2016) 
tried to answer the question of how fast banks did adjust their liquidity holdings when they 
were moved away from their targets. 
 
Starting with the adjustment speed of liquidity target ratio that can be observed on the light 
of the coefficient of lagged dependent variable which is considered as an indicator of the 
existence of dynamic liquidity structure as section 3.4 Shows. Results of DeYoung and 
Jang (2016) revealed that dynamic liquidity management was significantly observed, 
DeYoung and Jang (2016) reported that US banks close approximately 26% of the gap 
between actual loans to core deposits ratios and the target loans to core deposit ratios within 
a year. Therefore, it is hypothesized:  
H1a: ASEAN commercial banks converge towards NSFR.   
H1a: ASEAN commercial banks converge towards short term liquidity target ratio 
(SHORT).   
 
One of the factors that drive liquidity target ratios is the bank size. Theoretically, bank size 
is negatively associated with liquidity holdings.  Chen and  Mazumdar (1992) argued that 
larger banks tend to be less risk-averse than smaller banks. Boyd and Runkle (1993) 
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confirmed this, where larger banks are more probably to get public support in crises times 
which encourages them to bear high liquidity risk profiles. Other study done by Dietrich, 
Hess, and Wanzenried (2014) found that larger banks have historically not fulfilled the 
minimum required NSFR. Similarly, results of Cucinelli (2013a), Kashyap, Rajan, and 
Stein (2002), Kashyap and Stein (1995) and (2000), and Singh and Sharma (2016) suggest 
that bigger banks have a higher liquidity risk exposure, while smaller banks seem to be 
more risk-aversion as they face difficulties in accessing capital markets. (Aspachs, Nier, & 
Tiesset, 2005) found that the relationship between bank size and the liquidity holdings is 
not significant while results of (Vodová, 2011)  suggest that it is ambiguous. As discussed 
above, theories as well as empirical studies suggested that bank size has negative impact 
on liquidity. This implies that when bank size increases, liquid holdings decrease. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed as follow: 
H2a: Bank size has a significant relationship with NSFR. 
H2b: Bank size has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio. 
 
Another variable was included as a determinant of liquidity which is bank capital. Berger 
and Bouwman (2009), Diamond and Rajah (2000) and (2001) stated that capital might have 
a relationship with liquidity. (Dietrich et al., 2014) found that banks with higher capital 
ratios tend to maintain a stronger structural liquidity. Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried 
(2014) confirmed that as well. Additionally, Cucinelli, (2013b), Roman and Sargu (2015), 
Singh and Sharma (2016), and Vodová (2011) found that the banks’ capitalization 
positively affects overall bank liquidity. Theoretically, two conflicting views has been 
developed as was explained by Distinguin, Roulet, and Tarazi (2013). The first view states 
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that the relationship between bank capital and its liquidity holdings is positive (Berger & 
Bouwman, 2009; Diamond & Rajah, 2000, 2001; Gorton & Winton, 2000). On contrast, 
the second view states that high level of capitalization enhance banks’ ability to manage 
risks  leading to create more liquidity (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; von 
Thadden, 2004). Thus, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H3a: Bank capital has a significant relationship with NSFR. 
H3a: Bank capital has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio. 
 
Loan loss reserves ratio is another factor which captures the riskiness of bank assets and 
the banks’ degree of risk. A study done by (Roman & Sargu, 2015; Vodová, 2011) found 
a negative link between bank liquidity and its assets quality. (Cucinelli, 2013a) revealed 
that assets quality impacts only on the measure of the short-term liquidity risk. In contrast, 
results of  Chen, Chou, Chang, and Fang (2015) shows negative link between non-
performing loans – the higher NPL the lower assets quality- and banks’ liquidity buffers. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H4a: Quality of bank assets has a significant relationship with NSFR. 
H4b: Quality of bank assets has a significant relationship with short-term liquidity ratio. 
 
Banks that plan to achieve high levels of growth are expected to target higher levels of long 
term and illiquid assets. Consequently, banks would maintain low levels of liquidity buffers 
and this leads to more liquidity risk exposure. Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried (2014) found 
that banks with more rapid past growth have lower NSFRs, results of DeYoung and Jang 
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(2016) also show that fast growing banks maintain high levels of loans to core deposits. 
Hence, two hypotheses are developed as follow: 
H5a: Bank’s growth plan has a significant relationship with NSFR. 
H5b: Bank’s growth plan has a significant relationship with the short-term liquidity ratio. 
 
Another variable that is included in the model and could have an effect on liquidity is the 
cost of funding. It represents costs paid by banks for funds. Bunda and Desquilbet (2008) 
found that funding cost influences banks’ liquidity buffer. Alger and Alger (1999) and 
Munteanu (2012) also reported that an increase in liability cost leads banks to depend more 
on liquid assets. This implies that funding cost might influence the liquidity of banks 
positively. Accordingly, it is hypothesized the followings: 
 H6a: Bank’s funding cost has a significant relationship with NSFR. 
H6b: Bank’s funding cost has a significant relationship with short-term liquidity ratio. 
 
By moving to country specific factors that could determine bank liquidity levels, it is 
argued that bank liquidity tends to grow when macroeconomic risk goes up due to the shift 
of investors from using direct investment channels into banks deposits seeking insurance 
for their savings (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012). Similarly, Gatev and Strahan (2006) argued 
that banks deposits tend to increase when spreads of commercial paper market raise which 
leads to assets growth. According to Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005) and Delechat, 
Henao, Muthoora, and Vtyurina (2012), banks’ liquidity holdings are negatively associated 
with GDP growth and policy interest rates. Similarly, Valla and Saes-Escorbia (2006) 
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reported that bank liquidity is negatively associated with GDP growth. Along the same 
line, the results of Dinger (2009) showed that the relationship is negative between banks 
liquidity buffers and the economic condition measured by real GDP growth and real gross 
domestic product per capita. In addition, Vodová (2011) found negative impact of inflation 
rate and business cycle on banks’ liquidity. Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) and 
Saxegaard (2006) reported that policy interest rates negatively affect the excess reserves. 
Lucchetta (2007) emphasized that interbank interest rate is deemed motives banks hold 
liquid assets. Therefore, four hypotheses are developed as follow: 
H7a: GDP real growth has a relationship with NSFR. 
H7b: GDP real growth has a relationship with short-term liquidity ratio. 
H8a: Interest rate spread has a relationship with NSFR. 
H8b: Interest rate spread has a relationship with short-term liquidity ratio. 
 
In the literature, there is a lack in terms of examining the adjustment speeds of banks toward 
liquidity targets. Thus, this study follows DeYoung and Jang (2016) which is the only study 
that addressed the adjustment speeds of liquidity targets. Besides, the two studies that 
addressed the speed of adjustment of banks toward the capital targets (Berger, DeYoung, 
Flannery, Lee, & Öztekin, 2008; Mukherjee & Mahakud, 2010). It is expected that banks 
that operate at longer distance from their target ratio adjust their liquidity levels more faster 
than those that operate at shorter distances from target ratios. Therefore, the distance 
between actual and target ratios (the GAP) is considered as a factor that influence the 
bank’s speed of adjustment following DeYoung and Jang (2016) study.  
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Furthermore, it is also argued that the degree of adjustment speeds’ responding to liquidity 
gap could be affected by some external and internal factors. Among these factors are the 
economic conditions where banks may find it easy to adjust their liquidity levels during 
times of economic growth. DeYoung and Jang (2016) provided an evidence on this 
argument. Additionally, it is also argued that the financial crises are expected to have 
impact on the degree of adjusting liquidity buffers. On one hand, banks may find some 
difficulties at stressed times to easily adjust their liquidity buffers. On the other hand, banks 
are expected to be wary of operating away from their liquidity target levels during crises 
times. Therefore, it is expected that banks quickly adjust their liquidity buffers during 
crisis. 
 
When turn into internal factor, bank size is always deemed as a key factor that should be 
considered. Therefore, it is argued  that bank size has an effect on the speed of adjusting 
liquidity levels.  DeYoung and Jang (2016) stated that larger banks have faster adjustment 
speeds, maybe because it is easier for large bank to quickly adjust their liquidity level due 
to their higher abilities to access financial markets than small banks. Another justification 
is that larger banks could operate a way from their liquidity targets in the short-term horizon 
without suffering adverse consequences. lastly, DeYoung and Jang (2016) argued that 
banks operate above their target ratio adjust their liquidity levels faster than those that 
operate under their targets. Based on the above discussion and in line with DeYoung and 
Jang (2016), the following hypotheses are developed: 
H9a: Distance between liquidity actual ratio and target ratio has a significant relationship 
with NSFR’s speed of adjustment. 
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H9b: Distance between liquidity actual ratio and target ratio has a significant relationship 
with short term liquidity ratio’s speed of adjustment. 
H10a: Bank size has a significant relationship with NSFR’s speed of adjustment. 
 H10b: Bank size has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio’s speed of 
adjustment. 
H11a:  GDP real growth has a significant relationship with NSFR’s speed of adjustment. 
H11b: GDP real growth has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio’s speed 
of adjustment. 
H12a: Banks that are operating above their targets quickly adjust their long-term liquidity 
targets. 
H12a: Banks that are operating above their targets quickly adjust their short-term liquidity 
targets. 
H13a: Stresses of financial crises have a significant relationship with NSFR’s speed of 
adjustment. 
H13a: Stresses of financial crises have a significant relationship with short term liquidity 
ratio’s speed of adjustment. 
 
In line with DeYoung and Jang (2016), it is argued that banks that have faster speed of 
adjustment more likely would have high profitability. As these banks are able  actively 
manage their liquidity. Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed as:  
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H14a: NSFR’s speed of adjustment has a significant relationship with bank’s profitability. 
H14b: SHORT’s speed of adjustment has a significant relationship with bank’s 
profitability. 
 
3.4  Model Specification 
Dynamic panel data estimation is used in this study to answer the study questions by 
capturing the dynamic of bank liquidity risk management. This study follows (DeYoung 
& Jang, 2016) where a partial adjustment model is employed. This model allows finding 
the following aspects of bank liquidity management: firstly, estimating liquidity target ratio 
for each banking institution in each time period. Secondly, examining and estimating the 
factors that determine these target ratios. Thirdly, calculating the liquidity adjustment speed 
for each bank in each time period. Moreover and lastly, examining the determinant of these 
speeds of adjustment. After getting bank specific speed of adjustment, the impact of these 
speed on bank’s profitability is examined. 
 
The partial adjustment model starts with the assumption that each bank has a target 
liquidity ratio (TR) which is a linear function of a set of factors as shown in equation (1): 
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                     (1) 
Where: 
TR is either NSFR or short-term liquidity target ratio of bank i at time t. 
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𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1  is the set of bank characteristics that affect liquidity targets, including bank size, 
bank capital, assets quality, bank’s growth plan, funding cost, GDP growth, and 
interest rate spread, and 
β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, if the estimated value of β = 0 that could 
be attributed to either of two reasons: banks do not have systematic liquidity targets, 
or V is misspecified. 
Generally, banks should maintain their liquidity holdings at their desire -targets- ratios, 
meaning that the liquidity target ratio 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 should be equal to the observed -actual- ratio 
(𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡): 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡. However, banks could move away from their targets under the 
impact of internal or external factors. To return to their liquidity targets, banks make 
adjustment that potentially could be costly. Assuming that; the change in liquidity level 
from the last period to current period represents liquidity adjustment that a bank has made 
to close the gap between target and actual ratio. This adjustment toward liquidity target is 
not likely to be completed within one year. Thus, banks will partially adjust their liquidity 
holdings toward desire liquidity targets but not fully to the extent that actual ratios will be 
equal to target ratios. Therefore, banks close a constant proportion λ of the gap between 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 each period as shown in equation (2): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝜆 (𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                    (2) 
Where:  
λ  is the scalar adjustment speed to be estimated  
?̂?𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term.  
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Substituting equation (1) into (2) yields the following equation: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝜆 ( ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) + ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                     (3) 
Rearranging equation (3): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜆 (∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)  +  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                    (4) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  (∑ 𝜆𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
)  −  𝜆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                     (5) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (∑ 𝜆𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + (1 −  𝜆) 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                              (6) 
Since liquidity target ratio 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is considered to be dependent upon bank and country 
specific factors, namely: bank size (lnASSETS), capital (EQUITY), assets quality (LLRR), 
bank growth plan (GROWTH), funding cost (FUNDCOST), economic condition (GDP), 
and interest rate spread (IRS). Accordingly, equation (6) can be expanded as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (1 −  𝜆) 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝛽1lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽2EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝛽3LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜆𝛽4GROWTH𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝛽5FUNDCOST𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝛽6GDP𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝜆𝛽7IRS𝑖,𝑡−1  +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                                                        (7) 
By replacing (1 −  𝜆) with 𝛿0 and 𝜆𝛽𝑘  with 𝛿𝑘, equation (7) can be rewritten as: 
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𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛿0𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿1lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿2EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛿4GROWTH𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿5FUNDCOST𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿6GDP𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿7IRS𝑖,𝑡−1
+  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                       (8) 
?̂? can be recovered by subtracting the estimated 𝛿0 from 1(𝜆 = 1 − 𝛿0). 𝛽𝑘   can be 
calculated by dividing 𝛿𝑘by ?̂?. Then it is possible to use equation (1) to calculate the 
liquidity target ratio for each bank in each time period ( 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡). 
 
The coefficient λ in equation (7) represents the adjustment coefficient for banks. It 
illustrates the amount of adjustment that banks -in average- were adjusting their liquidity 
levels within one year. A value of 0 < |𝜆| < 1 reflects the impact of the adjustment costs 
which cause liquidity adjustment to be less than 1, meaning that banks do not completely 
adjust their liquidity holdings toward target levels within one year. A value of |𝜆| = 1 
means that banks completely adjust their liquidity holdings within one year. A high 
estimated value of adjustment speed λ reflects that banks were actively managing their 
liquidity buffers and/or facing lower adjustment costs and vice versa. 
 
Following (DeYoung & Jang, 2016), equation (8) is estimated using Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) to estimate the adjustment speed and to identify which of bank and 
country specific factors influence banks liquidity target ratios. The estimation of Equation 
(8) helps to estimate banks’ individual target ratio (𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡), it allows also to find the average 
adjustment speed for the entire sample, but it does not allow to estimate banks' individual 
adjustment speeds that is expected to change over time. To estimate bank’s individual 
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adjustment speed, It is assumed that it is a linear function of some predetermined 
explanatory factors as follows: 
𝜆𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛬𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                    (9) 
Where: 
𝜆𝑖,𝑡 is the bank-specific, time-varying speed of adjustment toward the 
liquidity target ratio 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1  is a vector of bank and time period factors that influence the adjustment 
speed 
𝛬 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated 
Substituting equation (9) into (3) yields the complete model: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 =  ( ∑ 𝛬𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ( ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) +  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                  (10) 
Since ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 represents the estimated target ratio 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 as illustrated above, so the 
difference between target and actual ratio ( ∑ 𝛽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝑛
𝑖=1
−  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) can be renamed as 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 . The change in actual liquidity ratio 𝐴𝑅 from the last to current period  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is renamed as 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡. Accordingly, equation (10) can be rearranged as follows: 
𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛬 ( 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1   𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 )
𝑛
𝑖=1
+  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                                             (11)  
60 
 
Where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1   𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector of explanatory variables that affect the bank-specific, 
time-varying speed of adjustment. Following DeYoung and Jang (2016), equation (11) is 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) to identify the factors that influence banks’ 
adjustment speeds. Using the estimated coefficients of equation (11), the parameter 𝛬 can 
be found. Thus, equation (9) is used to calculate the bank-specific and time-varying speed 
𝜆𝑖,𝑡. 
 
After estimating 𝜆𝑖,𝑡, (liquidity adjustment speeds) then its impact on the financial 
performance of banks is examined. Following DeYoung and Jang (2016), this impact is 
captured by using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the following equation: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 =   𝑎 + 𝑏𝜆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐 𝜆
2
𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑑lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑓LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                      (12) 
 
3.5  Variables Definition and Measurements 
Bank liquidity has become more complex, especially with its abundance of potential risk 
sources. Thus, measuring liquidity was a main concern for the previous studies where 
several measurements have been used. In this study, Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is 
used to measure the long-term liquidity, while short term liquidity ratio (SHORT) is used 





For the long-term liquidity, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is used. NSFR was 
introduced by Basel committee in 2010 for first time to addresses the long-term liquidity 
risk. NSFR is calculated by dividing the available stable funding (ASF) over required stable 
funding (RSF). Basel committee aimed by introducing NSFR to induce financial 
institutions to finance their businesses through stable, longer-term sources of financing and 
to hold fewer illiquid assets. Basel Committee in (2014) introduced a guideline to explain 
how NSFR must be calculated. Basel Committee spells out the weight of assets that make 
up the required stable funding (RSF) and the weights of liabilities that make up the 
available stable funding (ASF).  
 
The historical financial information published by banks do not allow to calculate NSFR as 
Basel III described it. However, NSFR can be reliable by estimating an approximate for 
the weights of assets and liabilities based on the available historical financial information. 
These weights have been used by previous studies such as (Ashraf, Barbara, & Rizwan, 
n.d.; Bonfim & Kim, 2013; T. H. Chen et al., 2015; DeYoung & Jang, 2016; Dietrich et 
al., 2014; Distinguin et al., 2013; Gobat, Yanase, & Maloney, 2014; King, 2013; Silva, 





Table 3. 1 
The weights of balance sheet items that comprise ASF and RSF to calculating NSFR 
Items weight 
RSF: 
Treasury securities                                     0.05 
Federal agency securities                               0.05 
State and municipal securities                          0.05 
Trading account securities                              0.5 
Securities purchased under resale agreements            0.5 
Mortgage backed securities                              0.5 
Federal funds                                           0.5 
Other securities                                        0.5 
Other investments                                       0.5 
Loans - net                                             0.85 
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries              1 
Customer liability on acceptances                       1 
Real estate assets                                      1 
Property, plant, and equipment - net                     1 
ASF: 
Items weigh 
Demand deposits                                         0.90 
Savings/other time deposits                             0.95 
Long term debt                                          1.00 
Equity 1.00 
 
Another dimension of liquidity risk is the short-term liquidity risk. Basel III introduced 
also the Liquidity Coverage Ratio standard (LCR) to address the short-term liquidity risk 
over 30 days. T calculate the LCR, it is required much of detailed information which was 
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not publicly disclosed. Thus, it is impossible for outsiders to calculate LCR based on the 
historical financial information published by banks. Therefore, another proxy is used to 
capture the liquidity risk in the short-term horizon. This proxy is used by (Delechat et al., 
2012). This measurement is calculated by dividing liquid assets over the deposits and short 
term debt as follows:   
Short term liquidity ratio = (Cash & due from banks plus investments)/ (deposits plus short 
term debt) 
 
One of the must variables used in this study is the size of bank.  It is argued that bank size 
is influencing the banks’ ability to hold liquidity. According to Bonfim and Kim (2013), 
larger banks seem to be have high liquidity risk profile, showing smaller liquidity holdings, 
higher loans to deposits ratio, and lower stable funding ratio. In this study, bank size is 
captured by taking the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets (lnASSETS). This 
measurement has been used by several researchers such as (Aspachs et al., 2005; Delechat 
et al., 2012; Dietrich et al., 2014; Distinguin et al., 2013). Another variable is the Bank 
Capital (EQUITY) which deemed to be a buffer against losses that banks could suffer while 
doing their business activities. It helps banks to stabilize and recover from uncertain shocks 
(Munteanu, 2012). Following (Bonfim & Kim, 2013; Bonner, Lelyveld, & Zymek, 2014; 
Dietrich et al., 2014; Horváth, Seidler, & Weill, 2014), Bank capital (EQUITY) is 
measured by using the ratio of equity to total assets.   
 
In this study, assets quality is also included and measured by the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans. This ratio reflects the banks’ degree of risk aversion as well as the 
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recognized riskiness of their loan portfolio. The higher the ratio of Loan Loss Reserve 
Ratio (LLRR), the more problematic are banks’ assets and vice versa. LLRR as a measure 
of assets quality has been used by many previous studies such as (Dietrich et al., 2014; 
Distinguin et al., 2013). Banks’ growth plan (GROWTH) is another variable included in 
this study, as banks that plan to achieve high level of growth are expected to maintain a 
lower level of liquidity buffers and invest heavily in loans and illiquid assets. Following 
DeYoung and Jang (2016), banks’ growth plan is captured by by calculating the average 
growth of bank’s total assets over the next two years. Additionally, cost of funding 
(FUNDCOST) is also included. It refers to the cost paid by banks for funds and estimated 
as the amount of interest rate expenses divided by total liabilities. Alger and Alger (1999) 
used this measurement and explained that the high ratio of funding cost may stimulate 
banks to hold more liquid assets which leading banks’ liquidity buffers to increase. 
 
Another variable namely Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used in this study as a country specific 
factor. This variable is included to capture the condition of economic and the business cycle as 
well. This variable is used by previous studies such as (Aspachs et al., 2005; Dietrich et al., 2014; 
Distinguin et al., 2013). Furthermore, Interest Rate Spread (IRS) is also included in this study. 
According to (Delechat et al., 2012), the difference between average lending and deposit interest 
rate (interest rate spread) is one of the country specific factors that could affect banks’ decisions 
about their liquidity holdings. It is an indicator which measures the opportunity cost of holding 
liquid assets. The higher the interest rate spread is the higher opportunity cost of holding liquid 
assets which gives banks an incentive to hold less proportion of liquid assets and instead grant loans 




Following Berger et al. (2008) DeYoung and Jang, (2016) and Mukherjee and Mahakud, 
(2010), the distance between actual and target optimal, or desired ratios (GAP) is included 
in the dynamic model to examine the adjustment speeds of any target, optimal, or desired 
ratio. It is expected that banks operate away from their target ratio to adjust their liquidity 
levels more quickly than those that operate at shorter distances from target ratios. The 
distance between actual and target ratios (GAP) is obtained by subtracting the actual 
liquidity ratio from the estimated ratio (the target ratio) for each bank at each interval.  
 
A dummy variable is included as value one is given, if actual ratio is higher than the estimated 
target ratio, otherwise zero is given. Following DeYoung and Jang (2016), it is expected that 
banks that operate above their NSFR targets (actual ratio is higher than the estimated target 
ratio) are more likely to adjust their liquidity levels faster than those that operate under their 
NSFR targets. This might be due to the difficulties of rising stable funds such as core deposit and 
long term debt. Another dummy variable is included to capture the global financial crisis. 
For this dummy variable value one is given if for years 2008 and 2009, other years are 
given zero.  In the last stage of this study, bank profitability is included. Profitability has been 
heavily studied as a key issue that concern all players and dealers with banking sectors. 
Following DeYoung and Jang (2016) and to achieve the last objective of this study, which 
is examining the impact of adjustment speed of the banks’ profitability, Return On Equity 
(ROE) is used to capture the banks’ profitability.    
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Table 3. 2 
Measurements of Variables 
The variable Notation Measurement Support 
Bank liquidity: 






(Ashraf et al., n.d.; Bonfim & Kim, 2013; 
T. H. Chen et al., 2015; DeYoung & Jang, 
2016; Dietrich et al., 2014; Distinguin et 
al., 2013; Gobat et al., 2014; King, 2013; 
Silva, 2016; Vazquez & Federico, 2015) 
Short term 
liquidity ratio 
SHORT Liquid assets 
divided by 
deposits and 
short term debt 
(Delechat et al., 2012) 
Bank size lnASSETS The natural 
logarithm of 
total assets 
(Aspachs et al., 2005; Delechat et al., 
2012; Dietrich et al., 2014; Distinguin et 
al., 2013) 
Capital EQUITY Equity to total 
assets 
(Bonfim & Kim, 2013; Bonner et al., 
2014; Dietrich et al., 2014; Horváth et al., 
2014) 
Assets quality LLRR Loan loss 
reserves divided 
by gross loans  
(Dietrich et al., 2014; Distinguin et al., 
2013) 
 
Growth Plan GROWTH The average 
growth of assets 
over the next 
two years. 
(DeYoung & Jang, 2016) 
Cost of 
funding 
FUNDCOST interest rate 
expenses 
divided by total 
liabilities 
 (Alger & Alger, 1999) 
Economic 
condition 
GDP GDP growth (Aspachs et al., 2005; Dietrich et al., 2014; 
Distinguin et al., 2013) 
Interest rate 
spread 
IRS  Lending rate 
minus deposit 
rate 





GAP Target ratio 
minus actual 
ratio 














ABOVE =1 if ratio actual 
is higher than 
target ratio 
(DeYoung & Jang, 2016) 
Financial 
Crisis 
CRISES =1 at 2008&2009, 
otherwise: 0 
Profitability:    
Return on 
equity 
ROE Net income 
divided by total 
equity 
(DeYoung & Jang, 2016) 
Return on total 
assets 
ROA Net income 
divided by total 
assets 




3.6  Sample Description and Data Collection 
To achieve the objectives of the study, annual bank level data accompanied with country 
level data are used. Bank level data is obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream while 
country level data is retrieved from World Bank reports. Thomson Reuters DataStream 
does not provide data of countries that does not have financial market, therefore the data 
of only six ASEAN countries is provided, namely; Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
 
The initial data set available in DataStream consists of 90 commercial banks. Three banks 
were omitted due to missing data, following DeYoung and Jang (2016), all variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The final sample of this study consists of 87 
commercial banks with unbalance panel data over 20-year time period (1996-2015). The 




Table 3. 3 
The distribution of the sample banks by country 
















EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the study. It starts with the descriptive 
statistics for the study variables namely the central tendency measure (mean) and the 
variability measures (standard deviation, maximum and minimum). It also displays the 
collinearity between the study variables. Furthermore, the findings of the three models of 
this study are reported and compared with previous findings. In section 4.3 and 4.4, the 
findings from the first stage which uses partial adjustment model and GMM estimation is 
presented and discussed. This stage is to achieve the first three objectives of this study 
which are examining whether banks do have liquidity target ratios or not, if so, how quickly 
they adjust their liquidity toward target levels, and what are the determinants of these target 
ratios? The next section presents and discusses results of the second stage which examine 
what are the determinants of speed of adjustment toward liquidity targets, this stage 
achieves fourth objective. Subsequently, 4.6 section reports results in the third stage which 
investigates the impact of speeds of adjustment toward liquidity target (as an indicator of 
active bank liquidity management) on banks’ financial performance. This stage achieves 
the final objective of the study. Finally, section 4.7 reports additional tests to support the 




4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.1 depicts descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variable used in 
the study. The numbers of observations are presented in the table where it varies from 
variable to another because the study uses an unbalance panel data.  
 
NSFR has 1.0894 mean, meaning that on average, ASEAN’s banks have NSFR above the 
required (NSFR = 1), with 0.4450 standard deviation, 0.1339 minimum value and 2.4606 
maximum value. SHORT variable’s mean was 0.3381, with 0.1695 standard deviation, 
0.0685 minimum value and 0.8802 maximum value.  
 
Turning to bank specific explanatory variables, the mean of banks’ total assets was USD 
18,800 billion, with USD37,800 billion as standard deviation, USD339,000 billion for 
largest bank in the sample and USD2,261 billion for smallest bank. Banks’ equity ratios 
varied from 4.07% to 86.74% with 17.52% as mean and 14.62% standard deviation. The 
highest ratio of loan loss provision (as indicator for the decreasing of assets quality) was at 
32.76% while the lowest was at 0.11%, 4.56% as mean and 5.07% standard deviation. 
Furthermore, the mean of growth plan for ASEAN bank (GROWTH) was 16.70% with 
19.14% standard deviation, -16.91% minimum and 117.4% maximum. In terms of the level 
of funding cost, the highest level was at 15.38% while 0.69% was the lowest, 4.66% mean 
and 2.86% as standard deviation. ASEAN banks, on average, have shown on average 
profitability rates of 6.26% & 0.75% for return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) 
respectively with standard deviation at 11.82% & 2.07% for ROE and ROA respectively. 
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For ASEAN banks’ profitability, the minimum values were - 59.08% and -13.46% while 
the maximum were 29.64% & 3.70% for ROE and ROA respectively. 
 
Turning to the country specific variables, the 6-ASEAN countries’ economies grew at 
4.64% on average over the last 20 years. The highest level of GDP was 15.24% and the 
extreme decrease was at 13.13%. Interest rate spreads were as follows: 4.04% mean, 2.18 
standard deviation, - 6.91% was the minimum value while 7.6808% was the maximum 
value. 
 
Regarding the estimated liquidity target ratios, ASEAN banks were found having target of 
NSFR and short term liquidity ratio (SHORT) on average at 1.49 and 64.17% respectively, 
fairly higher than observed (actual) NSFR ratio and almost two times the actual SHORT 
ratio. The descriptive statistics for other selected variables are presented in table 4.1. 
 
ASEAN banks have often maintained actual ratios of NSFR and SHORT lower than the 
estimated target ratios as their mean values of ABOVE dummy variable revealed (only 
0.1366 for ABOVE (NSFR) and 0.0641 for ABOVE(SHORT) with standard deviation at 
0.3435 & 0.2450 respectively). In contrast, actual ratios of the other alternative liquidity 
measurements were often lower than their estimated target ratios: (0.7840, 0.8288, 0.9549, 
0.8816 mean values for ABOVE(LTA), ABOVE(DTA), ABOVE(RSF), ABOVE(ASF) 
respectively). 
The variation of observed -actual- and estimated target ratios discussed above has been 
reflected on the amounts and directions of the distance between liquidity actual and target 
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ratios as the mean values of the variable reveal. Since SHORT and ASF had pretty spaced 
actual and target ratios, their distance from the target ratio were higher (their mean values 
were: 0.3057 & -0.4178 respectively). The other variability measures are available in table 
4.1. 
Finally, the estimated speeds of adjustment λ reveal that ASEAN banks quickly adjust their 
short-term liquidity holdings as expected (mean of λ SHORT is 0.5637 with 0.1187 
standard deviation, 0.1489 minimum and 0.7971 maximum λ). The mean value of NSFR’s 
speed of adjustment was lower at 0.1614 which reflects the nature of NSFR as long-term 
liquidity measurement. The minimum λ NSFR is -0.2229 and 0.5919 is the maximum. The 
mean values of the others as follows: 0.0707, 0.4440, 0.1917, and 0.0990 for λ LTA, λ 
DTA, λ RSF, and λ ASF respectively. Regarding to the multicollinearity problems, the 
correlation matrix presented in table 4.2 shows that there is no multicollinearity issue 
among the explanatory variables where the all variables do not exceed 0.5 except the 
proxies of one variables which are not used together in one regression (proxies of liquidity 





Table 4. 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition 
NSFR 1,248 1.0894 0.4450 0.1339 2.4606 
Available stable funding (ASF) divided by required 
stable funding (RSF) 
SHORT 1,184 0.3381 0.1695 0.0685 0.8802 Liquid assets divided by deposits and short term debt 
LTA 1,238 0.6429 0.1484 0.2170 0.8903 Loans to Total Assets 
DTA 1,235 0.7340 0.1348 0.0840 0.9170 Deposits to Total Assets 
RSF 1,245 0.6812 0.1101 0.3222 0.8405 Required stable funding to Total Assets 
ASF 1,248 0.7298 0.2567 0.0697 0.9595 Available stable funding to Total Assets 
       
TA 1,248 18,800,000  37,800,000  2,261  339,000,000  Total assets (USD millions) 
lnASSETS 1,248 15.2758 1.9968 10.4070 19.1797 Natural logarithm of assets  
EQUITY 1,246 0.1752 0.1462 0.0407 0.8674 Equity to total assets 
LLRR 1,130 0.0456 0.0507 0.0011 0.3276 Loan loss reserves divided by gross loans 
GROWTHPLAN 1,073 0.1670 0.1914 -0.1691 1.1740 The average growth of assets over the next 2 years 
FUNDCOST 1,239 0.0466 0.0286 0.0069 0.1538 Interest rate expenses divided by total liabilities 
GDP 1,740 0.0464 0.0381 -0.1313 0.1524 Annual real GDP growth 
IRS 1,731 4.0392 2.1800 -6.9125 7.6808 Lending rate minus deposit rate 
ROE 1,246 0.0626 0.1182 -0.5908 0.2964 Return on equity 





Table 4. 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition 
TR (NSFR) 1,162 1.4936 0.1484 1.0533 2.5082 Estimated target NSFR 
TR (SHORT) 1,162 0.6417 0.0658 0.4293 0.8917 Estimated target SHORT 
TR (LTA) 1,162 0.5265 0.0548 0.2914 0.7111 Estimated target LTA 
TR (DTA) 1,162 0.6315 0.0531 0.4187 0.7986 Estimated target DTA 
TR (RSF) 1,162 0.4165 0.0416 0.2667 0.6763 Estimated target RSF 
TR (ASF) 1,162 0.3185 0.0502 0.1069 0.5957 Estimated target ASF 
       
λ NSFR 1,071 0.1614 0.1171 -0.2229 0.5919 Estimated NSFR adjustment speed 
λ SHORT 1,026 0.5637 0.1187 0.1489 0.7971 Estimated SHORT adjustment speed 
λ LTA 1,063 0.0707 0.0434 -0.1205 0.1967 Estimated LTA adjustment speed 
λ DTA 1,059 0.4440 0.0818 0.1115 0.5787 Estimated DTA adjustment speed 
λ RSF 1,069 0.1917 0.0533 0.0233 0.3646 Estimated RSF adjustment speed 





Table 4. 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition 
ABOVE(NSFR) 1,157 0.1366 0.3435 0 1 =1 if NSFR actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
ABOVE(SHORT) 1,108 0.0641 0.2450 0 1 =1 if SHORT actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
ABOVE(LTA) 1,148 0.7840 0.4117 0 1 =1 if LTA actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
ABOVE(DTA) 1,145 0.8288 0.3768 0 1 =1 if DTA actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
ABOVE(RSF) 1,154 0.9549 0.2075 0 1 =1 if RSF actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
ABOVE(ASF) 1,157 0.8816 0.3232 0 1 =1 if ASR actual ratio is higher than target ratio 
      
 
GAP(NSFR) 1,157 0.3961 0.4321 -1.0689 2.0678 TR (NSFR) minus NSFR 
GAP(SHORT) 1,108 0.3057 0.1763 -0.3535 0.7272 TR (SHORT) minus SHORT 
GAP(LTA) 1,148 -0.1168 0.1554 -0.4461 0.4008 TR (LTA) minus LTA 
GAP(DTA) 1,145 -0.1047 0.1494 -0.3972 0.6350 TR (DTA) minus DTA 
GAP(RSF) 1,154 -0.2659 0.1161 -0.5274 0.2427 TR (RSF) minus RSF 





Table 4. 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 NSFR SHORT LTA DTA INASSETS EQUITY LLRR GROWTH FUNDCOST GDP IRS ROE ROA RSF ASF 
NSFR 
1               
SHORT 
0.5028 1              
LTA 
-0.486 -0.884 1             
DTA 
0.3283 -0.123 -0.031 1            
lnASSETS 
-0.12 -0.1 0.1409 -0.114 1           
EQUITY 
0.0013 0.2546 -0.005 -0.623 -0.178 1          
LLRR 
0.116 0.2273 -0.343 -0.154 -0.151 0.1186 1         
GROWTH 
-0.04 0.0168 0.0578 -0.009 -0.265 0.1106 -0.105 1        
FUNDCOST 
0.1163 0.1364 -0.159 0.1805 -0.58 -0.023 0.111 0.1252 1       
GDP 
-0.064 0.0167 0.0028 -0.111 -0.009 0.0594 -0.169 -0.002 -0.281 1      
IRS 
0.2376 -0.013 0.0362 0.1316 -0.216 0.06 -0.139 0.058 -0.028 0.256 1     
ROE 
0.0754 0.1346 -0.072 -0.003 0.0835 -0.001 -0.328 0.0588 -0.195 0.2269 0.0646 1    
ROA 
0.0868 0.1409 -0.022 -0.155 0.0994 0.2138 -0.425 -0.064 -0.299 0.3196 0.235 0.7415 1   
RSF 
-0.456 -0.846 0.7924 -0.13 0.0655 0.037 -0.1 -0.024 -0.182 -0.033 0.0179 -0.17 -0.107 1  
ASF 




4.3  The Estimated Liquidity Targets 
The first stage of this study’s model is to examine whether ASEAN banks do have liquidity 
targets, if so, how quickly they adjust their liquidity toward target levels? And what are the 
determinants of these liquidity targets? The answers of these questions are obtained by 
estimating equation (8) (given in the third chapter) using GMM estimation technique. Table 
4.3 displays the results of equation (8) for the two proxies of bank liquidity: NSFR and 
short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT). 
 
Starting with the diagnostic tests of the regression, table 4.3 reports Arellano-Bond test for 
zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, AR1 and AR2 examine the null hypothesis 
of error terms autocorrelation in the first order and the second order respectively. Since 
differenced form of the equation is used, so by construction error term is probably serially 
correlated at level 1 (AR1). AR2 detects the autocorrelation in levels, so it is the most 
important. Table 4.3 shows that the p-values of AR2 for both regressions (NSFR & 
SHORT) suggest that there is no autocorrelation and the error terms are not serially 
correlated at levels, accordingly, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Table 4.3 also 
reports Wald chi2 test, p-value for both regressions is less than 0.01, accordingly, the null 
hypothesis (which states that all coefficients of the determinants of liquidity target are 
jointly equal to zero) is rejected. 
 
To answer the first question of this study, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables 
 (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) are indicating the speed of adjusting the dependent variables (which are the 
proxies for bank liquidity holding ratios), and the significance of the coefficients confirm 
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the existence of bank liquidity targets among ASEAN banks. As reported in table 4.3, 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable  (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) for both proxies are significant at 
1%. The average estimated liquidity target for NSFR is 1.4936, and it is 0.6417 for short-
term liquidity ratio (SHORT). Both are higher than the average value of 1.0894 for NSFR, 
0.3381 for SHORT in the row data. 
 
For the second question of this study, the adjustment speeds are calculated by subtracting 
the estimated coefficient 𝛿0 from 1 (𝜆 = 1 − 𝛿0). The findings reveal that ASEAN banks 
adjust their NSFR quicker than their SHORT, maybe because of the high value of estimated 
target or due to the lower importance given by banks to short-term liquidity ratio comparing 
to NSFR that is more difficult to adjust and then, banks pay more attention to adjust NSFR 
than SHORT which can be adjusted easier. The adjustment speed for NSFR is 0.406 as 
reported in the table 4.3, meaning that ASEAN banks close 40.6% of the gap between their 
observed value of NSFR and their target NSFR within one year. At this rate of adjustment 
and assuming that all other conditions are unchanged; it would take 4.42 years1 to close 
90% of the estimated NSFR gap. Table 4.3 also shows that SHORT’s adjustment speed is 
0.366, meaning that ASEAN banks close 36.6% of the estimated SHORT gap (SHORT 
distance from its target) in the course of a year. At this rate of adjustment and assuming 
that all other conditions are unchanged; it would take around 5 years2 to close 90% of the 
estimated SHORT gap.  
 
                                                             
1 Following DeYoung and Jang (2016) it is calculated using: (1 − 0.406)𝑥 = 0.10 
2 Following DeYoung and Jang (2016) it is calculated using: (1 − 0.366)𝑥 = 0.10 
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The NSFR’s estimated adjustment speed of ASEAN banks (40.6%) is so far higher than 
the 13.31% NSFR’s estimated adjustment speed of US banks found by (DeYoung & Jang, 
2016). That means ASEAN banks are more active in managing their liquidity than US 
banks. Regarding to SHORT’s estimated speed of adjustment, (to the best of the researcher 
knowledge) there is no previous study has estimated the speed of adjustment by using the 
short-term liquidity ratio. Based on the findings reported and discussed above, the first two 
hypotheses H1a and H1b are accepted. 
 
 
4.4  Determinants of Liquidity Targets 
This section presents and discusses the empirical findings of the model that examine the 
impact of bank and country specific factors on the banks’ liquidity targets. Table 4.3 shows 
that the relationship between bank size and the target NSFR. The coefficient reported 
indicates that the liquidity of bank in the long-term horizon is positively related with the 
bank’ size, while it is negatively related with the target SHORT (which represents the 
liquidity of bank in the short-term horizon). Both are significant at 10% level.  These results 
reveal that ASEAN large banks more likely are setting higher NSFR and lower SHORT as 
the coefficients are 0.0247 and -0.0128 for NSFR and SHORT respectively. Based on the 
annual data, a doubling of bank size leads NSFR target to increase by an estimated 2.27%3 
while SHORT target decreases by an estimated 3.8%4. 
                                                             
3 (0.0247/1.0894) yields this result. 
4 (0.0128/0.3381) yields this result. 
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This positive relationship found between bank size and the target NSFR contrasts the 
findings of DeYoung and Jang (2016) who found a negative relationship, while the 
negative relationship between bank size and the target SHORT is consist with their findings 
and other studies such as  (Cucinelli, 2013; Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2002; Kashyap & 
Stein, 1995, 2000; Singh & Sharma, 2016). Based on these results, hypotheses H2a H2b 
are accepted. 
 
In terms of the bank capital, Table 4.3 shows that bank capital is negatively associated with the 
NSFR target at 1% statistical significance level. On the other hand, the relationship between bank 
capital and the SHORT target was found insignificant. This implied that banks are setting lower 
NSFR targets as equity capital increase. Having a coefficient of (-0.246) and based on the annual 
data, a one percent (100 basis point) increase in the equity to assets ratio is associated with an 
estimated 0.2258%5 (22.58 basis point) decrease in NSFR. Although equity is one of the 
elements that consists the numerator of NSFR, but it seems that banks tend to have more 
long term and illiquid asset when they maintain higher proportion of equity. These result 
also contrasts with (DeYoung & Jang, 2016), but it is in line a theoretical view states that 
high level of capitalization enhance banks’ ability to manage risks leading to maintain 
lower liquidity holdings (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; von Thadden, 
2004). Thus, hypotheses H3a is accepted while H3b is rejected. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4.3 shows that asset quality (measured by the Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 
(LLRR) has consistently negative and significant relationship with target liquidity for both 
                                                             
5 (0.0247/1.0894) yields this result. 
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proxies NSFR and SHORT. It is significant at 5% for NSFR and at 10% for SHORT. This 
implied that banks with high level of LLRR (which indicates the deterioration of asset 
quality) more likely are setting higher liquidity targets of NSFR and SHORT. Based on the 
annual data, a one percent (100 basis point) increase in the LLRR ratio is associated with 
an estimated 0.4323%6 (43.23 basis point) increase in NSFR and an estimated 0.5472%7 
(54.72 basis point) increase in SHORT. These results are in line with Roman and Sargu 
(2015) and Vodová (2011) who found a negative link between bank liquidity and its assets 
quality. Based on the findings mentioned above, hypotheses H4a and H4b are accepted. 
 
Table 4.3 also shows that bank growth plan (GROWTH) has consistently positive 
significant relationship with target liquidity for both proxies NSFR and SHORT. It is 
significant at 10% and 5% level for NSFR and SHORT, respectively. These results implied 
that ASEAN banks that have growth plan are setting higher liquidity targets of NSFR and 
SHORT. Based on the annual data, a one percent (100 basis point) increase in bank growth 
plan (GROWTH) is associated with an estimated 0.0896%8 (8.96 basis point) increase in 
NSFR and an estimated 0.1822%9 (18.22 basis point) increase in SHORT. Based on the 
findings, hypothesis H5a and H5b are accepted. 
 
Additionally, Table 4.3 shows that bank cost of fund has a positive significant relationship 
with target liquidity of NSFR at 1% degree of significance, but the relationship with 
SHORT was found insignificant. This implied that ASEAN banks with high level of fund 
                                                             
6 (0.471/1.0894) yields this result. 
7 (0.185/0.3381) yields this result. 
8 (0.0976/1.0894) yields this result. 
9 (0.0616/0.3381) yields this result. 
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cost more likely are setting higher liquidity targets of NSFR. Based on these results, 
hypothesis H6a is accepted but H6b is rejected. 
 
For the country-specific factors, Table 4.3 shows that the coefficient of GDP that represents 
the economic condition is insignificant with target liquidity of both NSFR and SHORT, 
while interest rate spread (IRS), in turn, is found to have a positive impact on the target of 
NSFR at 1% degree of significance, but the relationship with SHORT was found 
insignificant. These findings implied that ASEAN banks tend to maintain higher level of 
NSFR when interest rate spread goes up. Based on the annual data, a one percent (100 basis 
point) increase interest rate spread (IRS) is associated with an estimated 0.0186%10 (1.86 
basis point) increase in NSFR. These results is in line with Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and 
Gatev and Strahan (2006). Based on these findings, hypothesis H7a, H7b, and H8b are 
rejected, while H8a is accepted. 
 
  
                                                             
10 (0.0203/1.0894) yields this result. 
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Table 4. 3 
Adjustment Speed and Determinants of Target Liquidity 
 NSFR SHORT   
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.594*** 0.634*** 
 (16.14) (20.06)    
   
lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0247* -0.0128*   
 (1.75) (-1.89)    
   
EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.246*** -0.0125    
 (-4.21) (-0.43)    
   
LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1 0.471** 0.185*   
 (2.25) (1.69)    
   
GROWTH𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0976* 0.0616**  
 (1.90) (2.34)    
   
FUNDCOST𝑖,𝑡−1 1.252*** -0.152    
 (2.58) (-0.65)    
   
GDP𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.102 0.0882    
 (-0.41) (0.79)    
   
IRS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0203*** -0.00199    
 (2.74) (-0.58)    
   
CONSTANT -0.0541 0.317*** 
 (-0.22) (2.62)    
Target ratios 1.493607 0.641666 
Actual ratios 1.089374 0.338095 
λ (adjustment speed) 0.406*** 0.366*** 
 (16.14) (20.06)    
AR 1 -4.8935*** -4.5253*** 
AR2 .80838 .36265 
Wald chi2 355.72*** 572.74*** 
N 975 929 
Partial adjustment model for NSFR and short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT), using annual data 
cover 20 years (1996-2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table displays results of equation (8) 
using GMM estimation method. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1is the lagged DV. lnASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. EQUITY is the total 
equity to total assets. LLRR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. GROWTH is the 
average growth of assets over the next two years. FUNDCOST is the ratio of interest rate 
expenses to total liabilities. GDP is the annual growth of GDP. IRS is the interest rate spread 
(lending rate minus deposit rate). Coefficients marks ***, ** and * indicate statistical 





4.5  Determinants of Liquidity Adjustment Speed  
In this section, the findings of the second stage are reported and discussed. This stage is to 
achieve the fourth objective which is examining the determinants of ASEAN banks’ 
liquidity adjustment speed after calculating the individual speed of adjustment for each 
bank at each year using the outcome of the first stage (as explained in chapter 3). The 
results in this stage are obtained by estimating equation (11) using OLS estimation 
technique. Table 4.4 displays the results of equation (11) for the two proxies of bank 
liquidity (NSFR and short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT)). 
 
Starting with the diagnostic tests of the regression, table 4.4 reports F-stat test whereas the 
null hypothesis states that all coefficients of the determinants of speed of adjustment are 
jointly equal to zero. Table 4.4 shows that the P-value for both regressions are less than 
0.01 and significant at 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis is rejected which 
confirms the overall validity of regressions. Table 4.4 also reports R-squared that was 
0.1052 in NSFR regression and 0.1344 in SHORT regression. This result suggests that 
10.52% of the changes in banks’ speed of adjustment for NSFR, and 13.44% of the changes 
in banks’ speed of adjustment for SHORT are explained by variables used in this model. 
 
Table 4.4 also shows that the mean values of bank specific estimated speed of adjustment 
λ which is 16.1% for NSFR and 56.4% for SHORT. Regarding the mean value of estimated 
speeds of adjustment, for the SHORT it seems to be somewhat consistent with the 
constrained adjustment speed calculated in GMM regression (first stage) as an average for 
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all banks in the sample, while for NSFR it is much lower than the constrained adjustment 
speed calculated in GMM regression (first stage).  
 
Table 4.4 reports that the relationship between liquidity distance from target level and bank 
specific adjustment speed is consistently positive and statistically significant at 1% for both 
NSFR and SHORT. This means that 1% increase in liquidity distance from target level 
(GAP) increases bank specific liquidity speed of adjustment by an estimated 1.5%11 for 
NSFR, and by 1.01%12 for SHORT. Thus, the hypothesis of H9a and H9b are accepted.  
Regarding the bank size, it is found that the impact of bank size on speed of adjustment 
speed is negatively significant for SHORT but it is insignificant for NSFR as presented in 
table 4.4. This implied that larger banks have slightly slower speed of adjustment as a 
doubling of asset size is associated with a 4.08%13 reduction speed of adjusting SHORT’s. 
Based on these results, the developed hypothesis H10b is accepted but H10a is rejected.  
 
Regarding the impact of the economic condition on banks’ speed of adjusting toward their 
liquidity, a negative relationship was found for both proxies. it is found that the coefficient 
of NSFR is significant at 10% significant level and at 5% for SHORT. This implied that an 
increase of real GDP growth by 1% would lead bank specific liquidity speed of adjustment 
to decreases by an estimated 2.94%14 for NSFR, and 0.88%15 for SHORT. These results 
support the two hypotheses H11a and H11b.  the dummy variable that captures the impact 
                                                             
11 (0.241/0.161) yields this result. 
12 (0.570/0.564) yields this result. 
13 (0.0230/0.564) yields this result. 
14 (0.474/0.161) yields this result. 
15 (0.497/0.564) yields this result. 
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of being above the liquidity target on speed of adjustment is found insignificant for the two 
proxies, this mean that hypotheses H12b and H12a are rejected. Lastly, table 4.4 reports 
that stresses of financial crises negatively influence banks’ speed of adjustment for both 








Table 4. 4 
Adjustment Speed Estimation 
 Δ NSFR Δ SHORT 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.241*** 0.570*** 
 -2.65 -7.39 
   
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.00131 -0.0230*** 
 (-0.22) (-5.21) 
   
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.474* -0.497** 
 (-1.85) (-2.33) 
   
𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00299 0.0606 
 -0.04 -0.59 
   
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.111*** -0.0385* 
 (-3.65) (-1.86) 
   
CONSTANT -0.0615*** -0.0567*** 
 (-5.33) (-8.44) 
Mean estimated λ 0.161 0.564 
N 1101 1041 
F-stat 25.75*** 32.15*** 
R-squared 0.1052 0.1344 
Partial adjustment model for NSFR and short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT), using annual data 
cover 20 years (1996-2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table displays results of equation (11) 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method. All variables at are winsorized the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. GAP is the distance between actual and target ratios. lnASSETS is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. GDP is the annual growth of GDP. ABOVE =1 if ratio actual 
is higher than target ratio. CRISES =1 at 2008&2009. Coefficients marks ***, ** and * indicate 










4.6 The Impact of Speeds of Adjustment on Banks’ Financial Performance 
In this section, the findings of the last stage is reported and discussed where the impact of 
speeds of adjustment on ASEAN banks’ profitability is examined. Following DeYoung 
and Jang (2016),  ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to answer the fifth objective of this 
study.   
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report the impact of speed of adjustment on banks’ profitability 
represented by two proxies (ROE and ROA) for both NSFR and SHORT, respectively. P-
values for all regressions are less than 0.01 and significant at 1% significance level. This 
means that the null hypotheses are rejected which confirms the overall validity of all 
regressions. For the NSFR, R-squared are 0.0947 to 0.1035 for the ROE model and ROA 
model, respectively. For the SHORT, R-squared are 0.1376 to 0.1335 for the ROE model 
and ROA model, respectively 
 
For NSFR, Table 4.5 shows a consistently negative relationship between NSFR’s speed of 
adjustment and banks’ profitability in both models. The coefficient of λ NSFR is statistically 
significant at 1% for both profitability proxies (ROE and ROA). But the coefficients of 
λ2 NSFR were found insignificant. Regarding the control variables, bank size was found 
positively significant at 5% level with the bank profitability for both models (ROE and 
ROA). On the other side, bank equity ratio and loan loss reserve ratio have found 
significantly negative with the bank’s profitability where the coefficients of both bank 
equity ratio and loan loss reserve ratio are significant at 1% for both profitability proxies 




For the SHORT, table 4.6 shows a significant negative relationship between SHORT’s 
speed of adjustment and banks’ profitability in the two models (ROE and ROA). The 
coefficients of λ SHORT were statistically significant at 1% for both profitability proxies 
(ROE and ROA). On the flip side of coin, coefficients of λ2 SHORT is only positively 
significant with ROA and insignificant with ROE. Regarding the control variables, bank 
size has a found positively significant with the bank profitability at 1% significant for both 
ROE and ROA. On the other side, bank equity ratio and loan loss reserve ratio have found 
negatively significant with the bank’s profitability and the coefficients of bank equity ratio 
and loan loss reserve ratio are significant at 1% for both profitability proxies (ROE and 
ROA). Based on the findings reported on Tables 4.5 and 4.96, the two hypotheses H14a 





Table 4. 5 
The Impact of NSFR’s Speeds of Adjustment on Banks’ Financial Performance 
 
ROE ROA    
λNSFR -0.222*** -0.0326*** 
 
(-3.10) (-2.66)    
   
λ2NSFR 0.129 -0.0126    
 
(0.72) (-0.41)    
   
lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00509** 0.000845**   
(2.40) (2.32)    
   
EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.111*** -0.0185***  
(-3.94) (-3.82)    
   
LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.456*** -0.0748*** 
 (-6.27) (-5.99)    
   
CONSTANT 0.0535 0.00660    
 (1.58) (1.13)    
   
F-stat 20.39*** 22.49*** 
R-squared 0.0947 0.1035 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0901 0.0989 
N 980 980    
Banks’ profitability with respect to speed of adjustment for NSFR using annual data cover 20 
years (1996-2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table displays results of equation (12) using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method. All variables at are winsorized the 1st and 
99th percentiles. λNSFR is the estimated speed of adjustment for NSFR from stage 2. 
lnASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. EQUITY is the total equity to total assets. 
LLRR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. Coefficients marks ***, ** and * 









Table 4. 6 
The Impact of SHORT’s Speeds of Adjustment on Banks’ Financial Performance 
 
ROE ROA    
λSHORT -0.686*** -0.162*** 
 
(-2.77) (-4.08)    
   
λ2SHORT 0.333 0.100*** 
 
(1.47) (2.76)    
   
lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0150*** 0.00262***  
(5.94) (6.44)    
   
EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.208*** -0.0267***  
(-7.04) (-5.62)    
   
LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.472*** -0.0814*** 
 (-6.29) (-6.75)    
   
CONSTANT 0.165** 0.0343*** 
 (2.18) (2.83)    
   
F-stat 30.25*** 29.22*** 
R-squared 0.1376 0.1335 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1331 0.1290 
N 954 954    
Banks’ profitability with respect to speed of adjustment for short-term liquidity ratio 
(SHORT) using annual data cover 20 years (1996-2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table 
displays results of equation (12) using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method. All 
variables at are winsorized the 1st and 99th percentiles. λSHORT is the estimated speed of 
adjustment for short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT) from stage 2. lnASSETS is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. EQUITY is the total equity to total assets. LLRR is the ratio of loan 
loss reserves to gross loans. Coefficients marks ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 







4.7  Robustness Tests 
In this section, robustness tests are employed to confirm the findings of this study. In the 
first test, four different measurements (loans to assets ratio (LTA), Deposits to assets ratio 
(DTA), required stable funding to assets ratio (RSF) and available stable funding to assets 
ratio (ASF)) are used to provide more comprehensive analysis of bank liquidity 
management.  
 
Table 4.1 depicts descriptive statistics of these liquidity proxies as follows: 0.6429 mean, 
0.1484 standard deviation, 0.2170 minimum value and 0. 8903maximum value for loans 
to assets ratio (LTA). 0.7340 mean, 0.1348 standard deviation, 0.0840minimum value and 
0. 9170 maximum value for deposits to assets ratio (DTA). 0.6812 mean, 0.1101 standard 
deviation, 0.3222 minimum value and 0. 8405 maximum value for required stable funding 
to assets ratio (RSF). 0.7298 mean, 0.2567 standard deviation, 0.0697 minimum value and 
0.9595 maximum value for available stable funding to assets ratio (ASF). The mean values 
of these proxies’ estimated target ratio (LTA, DTA, RSF, ASF) were quite lower than their 
actual value with: 0.5267, 0.6315, 0.4165 and 0.3185 respectively. Regarding to the gap 
between actual and target ratios, these measurements had the following mean values: 
GAP(NSFR) 0.3961, 0.3057, GAP(LTA) -0.1168, GAP(DTA) -0.1047, GAP(RSF) -
0.2659.  
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of examining the determinants and the adjustment speeds of 
each measurement. The results show that p-values of AR2 for all regressions and this 
implies that there is no autocorrelation and the error terms are not serially correlated at 
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levels. Accordingly, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. Table 4.7 also reports the Wald 
chi2 test where the p-value in all regressions are less than 0.01. Accordingly, the null 
hypotheses (which states that all coefficients of the determinants of liquidity target are 
jointly equal to zero) are rejected. Based on Table 4.7, the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable  (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) for all proxies used are significant at 1% which confirms the 
existence of bank liquidity targets among ASEAN banks. This confirms that our results 
found are maintained and robust. As reported in table 4.7, the average estimated liquidity 
targets are as follows: 52.65% for LTA, 63.15% for DTA, 41.65% for RSF, and 31.85% 
for ASF. All these ratios are consistent with the ratios of NSFR and SHORT where these 
ratios are lower the actual ratio (the mean values that are taken from row data) (64.29% for 
LTA, 73.40% for DTA, 68.12% for RSF, and 72.98% for ASF). 
 These adjustment speed for these four alternative measurements of liquidity (52.65% for 
LTA, 63.15% for DTA, 41.65% for RSF, and 31.85% for ASF) imply that generally 
ASEAN banks adjust their target ratios. 
  
Regarding the determinants of liquidity targets, table 4.7 shows that the results found by 
using the four measurements are almost similar to the findings found for the NSFR and 
SHORT. These results are supporting the findings found for the NSFR and SHORT where 
only the GDP variable was insignificant in all models.  The other variables have found 
significantly related with the four alternative measurements and this in line with the 






Table 4. 7 
Adjustment Speed and Determinants of Target Liquidity (Robustness tests for four 
different measurements) 
 LTA DTA RSF ASF    
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.702*** 0.555*** 0.610*** 0.613*** 
 (19.49) (14.46) (15.74) (13.58)    
     
lnASSETS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00796 0.0134** -0.00679* -0.00445    
 (1.60) (2.52) (-1.73) (-0.62)    
EQUITY𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00361 0.0789*** 0.0265 -0.118*** 
 (0.17) (3.23) (1.59) (-3.94)    
LLRR𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.138* -0.0255 -0.0699 0.0203    
 (-1.83) (-0.29) (-1.13) (0.19)    
GROWTH𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0316* -0.0190 -0.0595*** 0.0236    
 (-1.68) (-1.00) (-4.04) (0.88)    
FUNDCOST𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.00880 0.378** -0.227* 0.0920    
 (-0.05) (2.00) (-1.70) (0.36)    
GDP𝑖,𝑡−1 0.134 -0.130 0.0000924 -0.182    
 (1.57) (-1.50) (0.00) (-1.40)    
IRS𝑖,𝑡−1 0.00394 0.00803*** -0.00728*** 0.00389    
 (1.54) (2.60) (-3.62) (0.96)    
_cons 0.0569 0.0678 0.424*** 0.372*** 
 (0.64) (0.68) (5.71) (2.93)    
Target ratios 0.526511 0.6315246 0.416495 0.31849 
Actual ratios 0.642934 0.7339772 0.681221 0.729752 
λ (adjustment speed) 
0.298*** 0.445*** 0.39*** 0.387*** 
-19.49 -14.46 -15.74 -13.58 
AR 1 -5.0408*** -2.2375** -4.3225*** -4.2978*** 
AR2 1.3352 1.3904 0.77664 0.21908 
Wald chi2 634.13*** 280.50*** 319.67*** 223.30*** 
N 973 965 972 975 
Partial adjustment model for the alternative liquidity measurements, using annual data cover 20 
years (1996-2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table displays results of equation (8) using 
GMM estimation method. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. LTA is 
the ratio of loans to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits to total assets. RSF is the ratio of 
required stable funding to total assets. ASF is the ratio of Available stable funding to total assets. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1is the lagged DV. lnASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets. EQUITY is the total 
equity to total assets. LLRR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. GROWTH is the 
average growth of assets over the next two years. FUNDCOST is the ratio of interest rate 
expenses to total liabilities. GDP is the annual growth of GDP. IRS is the interest rate spread 
(lending rate minus deposit rate). Coefficients marks ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Another robustness test is made to confirm that the results regarding examining the 
determinants of ASEAN banks’ liquidity adjustment speed are valid.  Using OLS 
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estimation technique for the four alternative measures (LTA, DTA, RSF and ASF), the P-
values as shown in Table 4.8 for all regressions are less than 0.01 and significant at 1% 
level. This means that the null hypotheses are rejected which confirm the overall validity 
of all regressions. Table 4.8 also reports that R-squared values were as follows: 0.098 for 
LTA, 0.1293 for DTA, 0.1597 for RSF, and 0.1094 for ASF. These are considered 
acceptable for all regression models 
 
Table 4.8 show that the mean values of bank specific estimated speed of adjustment λ 
toward target ratio for the four proxies. This implies that ASEAN banks adjust their DTA 
faster than the other ratios. It is worthy to highlight that the mean values of estimated speeds 
of adjustment for LTA and DTA are consistent with the constrained adjustment speed 
calculated in GMM regressions (first stage) as an average for all banks in the sample, but 
the mean values of estimated speed of adjustment for RSF and ASF are much lower than 
the constrained adjustment speed calculated in GMM regressions (first stage). These results 













Table 4. 8 
Adjustment Speed Estimation (Robustness tests for four different measurements) 
 Δ LTA Δ DTA Δ RSF Δ ASF 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.238** 0.0108 0.526*** 0.247* 
 -2.31 -0.11 -4.72 -1.91 
     
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.00368 0.0151** -0.00661** 0.003 
 (-0.62) -2.4 (-2.19) -0.65 
     
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.694** 0.839** -0.501*** 0.304 
 (-2.14) -2.02 (-2.95) -0.86 
     
𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.00573 -0.206*** -0.210* -0.149 
 (-0.11) (-4.75) (-1.92) (-1.24) 
     
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0118 -0.0114 -0.0201 -0.0508** 
 -0.38 (-0.32) (-1.25) (-2.15) 
     
CONSTANT 0.0205*** 0.00566 0.0508*** 0.0679*** 
 -4.79 -1.42 -9.94 -4.73 
Mean estimated λ 0.071 0.444 0.192 0.099 
N 1091 1084 1097 1101 
R-squared 0.098 0.1293 0.1597 0.1094 
Partial adjustment model for LTA, DTA, RSF and ASF, using annual data cover 20 years (1996-
2015) for ASEAN-6 countries. The table displays results of equation (11) using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation method. All variables at are winsorized the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
GAP is the distance between actual and target ratios. lnASSETS is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. GDP is the annual growth of GDP. ABOVE =1 if ratio actual is higher than target ratio. 
CRISES =1 at 2008&2009. Coefficients marks ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 










CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The structure of this final chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents a summary 
of this study. Subsequently, in section 5.3, implications of the study are explained in 
relation to various parties concerned. Lastly, limitations of the study are discussed, leading 
to some suggestions and recommendations for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Study 
The main aim of study is to examine whether ASEAN banks manage their liquidity or not. 
if so, how effective the liquidity risk has been managed. Two liquidity measurements were 
sed, the first one is NSFR which indicates banks’ long-term liquidity buffer and the second 
one is the short-term liquidity ratio. A research framework consists of three stages in order 
to achieve the five objectives of this study. 
 
The first stage uses partial adjustment model and GMM estimation in order to achieve the 
first three objectives of this study. The first objective is to examine whether ASEAN banks 
do have liquidity target ratios which can be observed through the lagged dependent variable 
that indicates banks’ speed of adjusting liquidity ratios, the significance of lagged 
dependent variable’s coefficient confirms the existence of bank liquidity targets. Results 
of partial adjustment model show that the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable 
 (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) for both liquidity proxies examined by the study are significant at 1% 
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significance level. The average estimated liquidity target for NSFR is 1.4936, and it is 
0.6417 for short-term liquidity ratio (SHORT). These findings are in line with DeYoung 
and Jang (2016), they confirm that ASEAN banks do have liquidity targets. 
 
The second objective is to estimate the speed of adjustment of ASEAN banks towards their 
liquidity target ratios. The findings reveal that ASEAN banks adjust their NSFR quicker 
than their SHORT, maybe because of the high value of estimated target or due to the lower 
importance given by banks to short-term liquidity ratio comparing to NSFR that is more 
difficult to adjust and then, banks pay more attention to adjust NSFR than SHORT which 
can be adjusted easier. The adjustment speed for NSFR is 0.406 and 0.366 for SHORT. 
 
Third objective was also obtained using GMM estimation method. It aims to examine what 
are the determinants of banks’ liquidity target ratios. A set of bank specific and 
macroeconomic factors are used in this study to examine their impact on banks’ liquidity 
buffers. These factors are bank size, capital, assets quality, growth plan, cost of funding, 
economic condition, and interest rate spread. The results reveal that the liquidity of bank 
in the long-term horizon is positively related with the bank’ size, while it is negatively 
related with the target SHORT (which represents the liquidity of bank in the short-term 
horizon). 
 
Bank capital was found negatively related with NSFR target at 1% statistical significance 
level but the impact on SHORT target was found insignificant. This means that banks are 
setting lower NSFR targets as equity capital increase. Although equity is one of the 
elements that consists the numerator of NSFR, but it seems that banks tend to have more 
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long term and illiquid asset when they maintain higher proportion of equity. Results reveal 
that asset quality has consistently negative and significant relationship with target liquidity 
for both proxies NSFR and SHORT. On contrasts, bank growth plan (GROWTH) was 
found positively significant with target liquidity for both proxies NSFR and SHORT. The 
last bank specific character used in the model is the bank funding cost which was found 
positively related with the target liquidity of NSFR at 1% degree of significance, but the 
relationship with SHORT was found insignificant. 
 
For the country-specific factors, results reveal that economic condition does not affect 
target liquidity either NSFR or SHORT. However, interest rate spread was found to have 
a positive impact on the target of NSFR at 1% degree of significance, but the relationship 
with SHORT was found insignificant. Table 5.1 summarizes the hypotheses testing results 
for first stage which achieves the first three objectives. 
 
The second stage uses OLS estimation technique to achieve the fourth objective of the 
study which examines the determinants of ASEAN banks’ liquidity adjustment speed after 
calculating the individual speed of adjustment for each bank at each year using the outcome 
of the first stage. Results of this stage reveal that liquidity distance from target level (GAP) 
positively affects bank specific adjustment speed (statistically significant at 1% for both 
NSFR and SHORT). Three factors were found negatively related with bank specific 
adjustment speed toward liquidity target. These factors are bank size, GDP growth, and 
financial crises. The coefficient of the dummy variable (when banks have NSFR and 




Table 5. 1 
Hypotheses Testing Results for First Stage  
H1a ASEAN commercial banks converge towards NSFR Accepted 
H1b ASEAN commercial banks converge towards SHORT    Accepted 
H2a bank size has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 
H2b bank size has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio Accepted 
H3a Bank capital has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 
H3b Bank capital has a significant relationship with short term liquidity 
ratio 
Rejected 
H4a Quality of bank assets has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 
H4b Quality of bank assets has a significant relationship with short-term 
liquidity ratio 
Accepted 
H5a Bank’s growth plan has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 
H5b Bank’s growth plan has a significant relationship with the short-term 
liquidity ratio 
Accepted 
H6a Bank’s funding cost has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 
H6b Bank’s funding cost has a significant relationship with short-term 
liquidity ratio 
Rejected 
H7a GDP real growth has a relationship with NSFR Rejected 
H7b GDP real growth has a relationship with short-term liquidity ratio Rejected 
H8a Interest rate spread has a significant relationship with NSFR Accepted 







Finally, third stage achieves the fifth objective which investigates the impact of speeds of 
adjustment toward liquidity target (as an indicator of the effectiveness of bank liquidity 
management) on banks’ financial performance. Interestingly, results of this stage suggest 
that liquidity’s speeds of adjustment negatively affect banks’ profitability. Table 5.2 
summarizes the hypotheses testing results for second and third stages which achieve the fourth and 
fifth objectives. 
 
Table 5. 2 
Hypotheses Testing Results for Second and third Stages  
H9a Distance between liquidity actual ratio and target ratio has a significant 
relationship with NSFR’s speed of adjustment 
Accepted 
H9b Distance between liquidity actual ratio and target ratio has a significant 
relationship with short term liquidity ratio’s speed of adjustment 
Accepted 
H10a Bank size has a significant relationship with NSFR’s speed of 
adjustment. 
Rejected 
H10b Bank size has a significant relationship with short term liquidity ratio’s 
speed of adjustment. 
Accepted 
H11a GDP real growth has a significant relationship with NSFR’s speed of 
adjustment. 
Accepted 
H11b GDP real growth has a significant relationship with short term liquidity 
ratio’s speed of adjustment. 
Accepted 
H12a Banks that are operating above their targets quickly adjust their long-
term liquidity targets. 
Rejected 
H12b Banks that are operating above their targets quickly adjust their short-
term liquidity targets. 
Rejected 
H13a Stresses of financial crises have a significant relationship with NSFR’s 
speed of adjustment. 
Accepted 
H13b Stresses of financial crises have a significant relationship with short 
term liquidity ratio’s speed of adjustment. 
Accepted 
H14a NSFR’s speed of adjustment has a significant relationship with bank’s 
profitability 
Accepted 








5.3 Implications of the Study 
Several implications can be provided as a result of this study. The implications are divided 
into theoretical and practical. For the theoretical implications, this study has contributed to 
the banking liquidity risk literature by providing results at the two levels of liquidity (long-
term liquidity and short-term liquidity); and by providing cross-country evidence namely 
six-ASEAN countries. Importantly, this study makes a valuable contribution to the banking 
literature by estimating the speed of adjustment toward liquidity targets which is still 
largely untouched area of research. Another theoretical implication is the support this study 
provides to the proposition of being banks do manage their liquidity and have speed of 
adjustment.   
 
In terms of practical implication, the results of this study provide empirical evidence about 
the factors that affect the speed of adjustment toward liquidity ratios among banks and how 
the speed of adjustment is influencing the banks’ profitability. The empirical evidence 
suggests that adjusting liquidity has some cost that make the adjustment speed negatively 
links with banks’ profitability. The findings of this study provide useful information for 
the policy makers in ASEAN countries to better understanding of ASEAN banks behavior 
of liquidity management which could help them to cope with challenges of enhancing the 
integration of ASEAN financial sectors as projected to be achieved at 2025. 
 
In addition, it is important for banks managers to understand what are the factors that affect 
liquidity target and the speed of adjustment toward liquidity target, and more importantly 




5.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
One of the limitations of this study is the data sampling especially with regards to the use 
of longer time period or the inclusion of all banks including unlisted banks that their data 
are not available in Thomson Reuters’ database “DataStream” as such data provide a more 
robust model structure. Thus, it is recommended that future studies should include unlisted 
and foreign banks and extend to other developing regions. 
 
Another issue is the differences among countries. Countries differ in term of economic, 
regulations, banking behavior and the degree of sophistication of financial sector. 
Therefore, it is suggested for future studies to consider these differences, and even to 
provide analysis for each country separately. 
 
Another limitation is the inability to get detailed information in order to calculate the 
proposed NSFR and LCR (liquidity coverage ratio). Regarding historical data, this 
limitation cannot be resolved since the disclosure of such information was limited to bank 
insiders. However, NSFR can be calculated as approximation while LCR cannot be found 
using historical information. To avoid this problem, normal short-term liquidity ratio was 







Acharya, V. (2006). Liquidity risk : causes, consequences and implications for risk 
management. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(6), 460–463. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4417781 Accessed. 
Acharya, V., & Naqvi, H. (2012). The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk 
taking over the business cycle. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(2), 349–366. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.05.014 
Acharya, V. V., & Merrouche, O. (2013). Precautionary hoarding of liquidity and interbank 
markets: Evidence from the subprime crisis. Review of Finance, 17(1), 107–160. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs022 
Agenor, P.-R., McDermott, C. J., & Prasad, E. S. (2000). Macroeconomic fluctuations in 
developing countries: some stylized facts. World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 251. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/14.2.251 
Alger, G., & Alger, I. (1999). Liquid Assets in banks: theory and practice. Boston College 
University Libraries. 
Allen, F., & Anthony, M. S. (1998). The theory of financial intermediation. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 21(11–12), 1461–1485. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01388162 
Allen, F., Chui, M. K. F., & Maddaloni, A. (2004). Financial systems in Europe, the USA, 
and Asia. Oxford Review of Ecnomic Policy, 20(4), 490–508. 
 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grh029 
Almekinders, G., Fukuda, S., Mourmouras, A., Zhou, J.-P., & Zhou, Y. S. (2015). ASEAN 
financial integration. IMF Working Papers (WP/15/34). 
 https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484386491.001 
Angora, A., & Roulet, C. (2011). Liquidity assessment and the use of liquidity ratio as 




Ashraf, D., Barbara, L., & Rizwan, M. S. (n.d.). Does the implementation of a Net Stable 
Funding Ratio enhance the financial stability of the banking industry? An 
international study, 1–36. 
Aspachs, O., Nier, E., & Tiesset, M. (2005). Liquidity, banking regulation and the 
macroeconomy: evidence on bank liquidity holdings from a panel of UK-resident 
banks. Unpublished Manuscript. BIS, 1–26. 
BCBS. Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and 
monitoring, December 2010, Basel Committee on Banking Supervison (2010). 
BCBS. Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 1–75 (2013). 
BCBS. Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio (2014). 
Benston, G. J., & Smith, C. W. (1976). A transactions cost approach to the theory of 
financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 31(2), 215–231. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01882.x 
Berger, A. N., & Bouwman, C. H. S. (2009). Bank liquidity creation. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 22(9), 3779–3837. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhnl04 
Berger, A. N., DeYoung, R., Flannery, M. J., Lee, D., & Öztekin, Ö. (2008). How do large 
banking organizations manage their capital ratios? Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 34(2–3), 123–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-008-0044-5 
Bhattacharya, S., & Thakor, A. V. (1993). Contemporary banking theory. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 3, 2–50. 
Bonfim, D., & Kim, M. (2013). Liquidity risk in banking: is there herding? 
Bonner, C., Lelyveld, I. van, & Zymek, R. (2014). Banks’ liquidity buffers and the role of 






Boyd, J. H., & Runkle, D. E. (1993). Size and performance of banking firms. Testing the 
predictions of theory. Journal of Monetary Economics, 31(1), 47–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(93)90016-9 
Brunnermeier, M. K. ., & Pedersen, L. H. (2009). Market liquidity and funding liquidity. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2201–2238. 
Bryant, J. (1980). Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility: A theory of 
banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 4, 335–344. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.003 
Bunda, I., & Desquilbet, J.-B. (2008). The bank liquidity smile across exchange rate 
regimes. International Economic Journal, 22(3), 361–386. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10168730802287952 
Burton, D. (2007). Asia and the international monetary fund: ten years after the Asian 
crisis. In B. Muchhala (Ed.), Ten years after: revisiting the Asian financial crisis (p. 
Washington DC.). 
Chan, E., & Worth, M. (2011). Basel III and project finance In this article. Project Finance 
International. 
Chen, A. H., & Mazumdar, S. C. (1992). An instantaneous control model of bank reserves 
and Federal funds management. Journal of Banking and Finance, 16(6), 1073–1095. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(92)90060-D 
Chen, T. H., Chou, H. H., Chang, Y., & Fang, H. (2015). The effect of excess lending on 
liquidity creation and net stable funding: evidence from China. International Review 
of Economics and Finance, 36, 54–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2014.11.007 
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., & Tehranian, H. (2011). Liquidity risk 
management and credit supply in the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 
101(2), 297–312. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.001 
Cucinelli, D. (2013a). The determinants of bank liquidity risk within the Context of Euro 
Area. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research in Business, 2(10), 51–64. 
107 
 
Cucinelli, D. (2013b). The relationship between liquidity risk and probability of default: 
Evidence from the euro area. Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets and 
Institutions, 3(1), 42–50.  
Delechat, C., Henao, C., Muthoora, P. ., & Vtyurina, S. (2012). The determinants of banks’ 
liquidity buffers in Central America. International Monetary Fund. 
Deshmukh, S. D. ., Greenbaum, S. I. ., & Kanatas, G. (1983). Interest rate uncertainty and 
the financial intermediary ’ s choice of exposure. The Journal of Finance, 38(1), 141–
147. 
DeYoung, R., & Jang, K. Y. (2016). Do banks actively manage their liquidity? Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 66(November), 143–161. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.11.013 
Diamond, D. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of 
Economic Studies, 51(3), 393–414. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297430 
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Debt Maturity structure and liquidity risk. Oxford University 
Press, 106(3), 709–737. 
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs , deposit insurance , and liquidity. 
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419. 
Diamond, D. W., & Rajah, R. G. (2000). A Theory of trading volume. The Journal of 
Finance, 55(6), 2431–2465. 
Diamond, D. W., & Rajah, R. G. (2001). Banks, short-term debt and financial crises: 
theory, policy implications and applications. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy, 54(1), 37–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2231(01)00040-9 
Dietrich, A., Hess, K., & Wanzenried, G. (2014). The good and bad news about the new 
liquidity rules of Basel III in Western European countries. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 44(1), 13–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.041 
Dinger, V. (2009). Do foreign-owned banks affect banking system liquidity risk? Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 37(4), 647–657.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2009.04.003 
108 
 
Distinguin, I., Roulet, C., & Tarazi, A. (2013). Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: 
Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 37(9), 3295–3317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.027 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm.  The Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(2), 288–307. 
Flannery, M. J. (1994). Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage : optimally 
financing banking firms. The American Economic Review, 84(1), 320–331. 
Freixas, X., & Rochet, J.-C. (2008). Microeconomics of banking. Statewide agricultural 
land use baseline 2015 (Second Edi, Vol. 1). The MIT Press Cambridge, 
Massachusetts London, England. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Gatev, E., Schuermann, T., & Strahan, P. E. (2009). Managing bank liquidity risk : how 
deposit-loan synergies vary with market conditions. The Review of Financial Studies, 
22(3), 995–1020. 
Gatev, E., & Strahan, P. E. (2006). Banks’ advantage in hedging liquidity risk: theory and 
evidence from the commerical paper market. Journal of Finance, 61(2), 867–892. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00857.x 
Gobat, J., Yanase, M., & Maloney, J. (2014). The Net Stable Funding Ratio: impact and 
issues for consideration. IMF Working Paper, 14(106), 1. 
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498346498.001 
Gorton, G., & Pennacchi, G. (1990). American finance association financial intermediaries 
and liquidity creation. The Journal of Finance, 45(1), 49–71. 
Gorton, G., & Winton, A. (2000). Liquidity provision and the social cost of bank capital.  
Gregory, K., & Hambusch, G. (2015). Factors driving risk in the US banking industry the 
role of capital, franchise value and lobbying Katina. International Journal of 
Managerial Finance, 11(3), 388–410. https://doi.org/10.1108/EL-01-2014-0022 




Hackethal, A., Rauch, C., Steffen, S., & Tyrell, M. (2010). Determinants of bank liquidity 
creation. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343595 
Hartlage, A. W. (2012). The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and financial stability. 
Michigan Law Review, 111(3), 453–483. 
Hong, H., Huang, J.-Z., & Wu, D. (2014). The information content of Basel III liquidity 
risk measures. Journal of Financial Stability, 15, 91–111. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.09.003 
Horváth, R., Seidler, J., & Weill, L. (2014). Bank capital and liquidity creation: Granger-
causality evidence. Journal of Financial Services Research, 45(3), 341–361. 
Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10693-013-0164-4 
Huang, R., & Ratnovski, L. (2011). The dark side of bank wholesale funding. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 20(2), 248–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2010.06.003 
Isa, M. Y. M., Choong, Y. V., Fie, D. Y. G., & Rashid, M. Z. H. A. (2016). Financial 
vulnerability, capital flow reversals, and divergence macro-prudential policies posing 
challenges to the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF). Journal of 
Modern Accounting and Auditing, 12(5), 250–267. https://doi.org/10.17265/1548-
6583/2016.05.002 
Jacklin, C. (1987). Demand deposits, trading restrictions, and risk sharing. Contractual 
Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade.  
Kashyap, A. K., Rajan, R., & Stein, J. C. (2002). Banks as liquidity providers : an 
explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit- taking. The Journal of 
Finance, 57(1), 33–73. 
Kashyap, A. K., & Stein, J. C. (1995). The impact of monetary policy on bank balance 
sheets. Carnegie-Rochester Confer. Series on Public Policy, 42(C), 151–195. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(95)00032-U 
Kashyap, A. K., & Stein, J. C. (2000). What do a million observations on banks say about 




King, M. R. (2013). The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest margins. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(11), 4144–4156. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.017 
Kowalik, M. (2014). To sell or to borrow ? A theory of bank liquidity management 
preliminary. 
Kumar, M., & Yadav, G. C. (2013). Liquidity risk management in bank: a conceptual 
framework. AIMA Journal of Management & Research, 7(2). 
Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1976). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and 
financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371–387. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2326770 
Lindgren, C., Baliño, T. J. T., Enoch, C., Gulde, A., Quintyn, M., & Teo, L. (1999). 
Financial sector crisis and restruction: lessosn from Asia. IMF Occasional Paper 
(Vol. 188). 
Lucchetta, M. (2007). What do data say about monetary policy, bank liquidity and bank 
risk taking? Economic Notes, 36(2), 189–203. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0300.2007.00180.x 
Macleod, H. D. (1866). The theory and practice of banking. Longmans, Green, Reader, & 
Dyer.  
Matz, L., & Neu, P. (2007). Liquidity risk measurement and management liquidity risk 
measurement and management. John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd. 
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261–297. 
Mukherjee, S., & Mahakud, J. (2010). Dynamic adjustment towards target capital structure: 






Munteanu, I. (2012). Bank liquidity and its determinants in Romania. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 3(12), 993–998. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(12)00263-8 
Niehans, J., & Hewson, J. (1976). The Eurodollar Market and monetary theory. Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 8(1), 1–27. 
Ötker-Robe, İ., Pazarbasioglu, C., Melo, F., Podpiera, J., Sacasa, N., & Santos, A. (2010). 
Impact of regulatory reforms on large and complex financial institutions. IMF Staff 
Position Note, 10(16), 13. 
Phillips, C. A. (1920). Bank credit: A study of the principles and factors underlying 
advances made by banks to borrowers. Macmillan.  
Ramakrishnan, R. T. S., & Thakor, A. V. (1984). Information reliability and a theory of 
financial intermediation. The Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 415.  
Randhawa, D. S., & Maru, J. L. (n.d.). Wealth effects of bank restructuring policies 
following the asian financial crisis. 
Repullo, R. (2004). Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 156–182. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2003.08.005 
Roman, A., & Sargu, A. C. (2015). The Impact of bank-specific factors on the commercial 
banks liquidity: empirical evidence from CEE countries. Procedia Economics and 
Finance, 20(15), 571–579. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00110-0. 
Roman, A., & Şargu, A. C. (2014). Banks liquidity risk analysis in the new European Union 
member countries: Evidence from Bulgaria and Romania. Procedia Economics and 
Finance, 15(14), 569–576. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00512-7 
Saunders, A., & Cornett, M. M. (2008). Financial Institutions Management (Sixth). 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Saxegaard, M. (2006). Excess liquidity and effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence 




Schumpeter, J. A. (1954). History of economic analysis. https://doi.org/10.2307/2145638 
Silva, A. (2016). Strategic complementarity in banks’ funding liquidity choices and 
financial stability. 
Singh, A., & Sharma, A. K. (2016). An empirical analysis of macroeconomic and bank-
speci fi c factors affecting liquidity of Indian banks. Future Business Journal, 2(1), 
40–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fbj.2016.01.001 
Subrahmanyam, A. (1991). A Theory of trading in stock index futures. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 4(1), 17–55. 
Takatoshi, I., & Hashimoto, Y. (2007). Bank restructuring in Asia : Crisis management in 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and prospects for crisis prevention -
Malaysia-. 
Thakor, A. V. (1992). Maturity transformation. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money 
and Finance (pp. 678–680).  
Tirole, J. (2011). Illiquidity and all its friends. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2), 287–
325. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.287 
Valla, N., & Saes-Escorbia, B. (2006). Bank liquidity and fi nancial stability. In Financial 
Stability Review.  
Vazquez, F., & Federico, P. (2015). Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the 
global financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 61, 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.08.023 
Vento, G. a., & Ganga, P. La. (2009). Bank liquidity risk management and supervision : 
which lessons from recent market turmoil ? Journal of Money, Investment and 
Banking, 10(10), 79–126. 
Vodová, P. (2011). Liquidity of Czech commercial banks and its determinants. 





von Thadden, E. L. (2004). Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: 
The winner’s curse. Finance Research Letters, 1(1), 11–23. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1544-6123(03)00006-0 
Walsh, J. P. (2014). The future of Asian finance. Finance and Development, 51(2), 19–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0034-3617(11)70034-0 
Werner, R. A. (2014). Can banks individually create money out of nothing? - The theories 
and the empirical evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis, 36(C), 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.07.015 
Werner, R. A. (2016). A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the 
conclusive evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis, 46, 361–379. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2015.08.014 
Yamanaka, T. (2014). Integration of the ASEAN banking sector. Institute for International 
Monetary Afffairs, 18(1), 1–21. 
 
 
